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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, Alan Watson published his short work, Legal Transplants: An 
Approach to Comparative Law.1 It was written in 1970, originating in 
lectures on jurisprudence given at the University of Virginia.2  The delay in 
publication was due not only to lack of interest in the book from publishers, 
but also because a colleague had discouraged its publication.3  Alan likes to 
say that it “fell stillborn from the press.”4  Perhaps to some extent it did.5  It 
certainly does not seem to have attracted many reviews.  A quarter of a 
century later, however, Thomas Carbonneau could describe Legal 
Transplants as a “seminal” text in comparative law.6  More than a decade 
after Carbonneau’s claim, a book on methods in comparative law included 
“Legal Transplants” as providing one of the standard methodological 
approaches to the discipline, devoting to it a “Part” described as “Legal 
Transplants and Transnational Codes: Questioning on Cultural Biases and 
Scientific Statements.”7  The author of one of the chapters described Legal 
Transplants as a “magisterial book.”8  Other chapters also routinely used 
Alan’s work as a reference.9  But by 2012, the date of publication of this 
book, Legal Transplants had already long come in from the cold; or, to use 
Alan’s metaphor, the stillborn work had acquired life and grown up to be a 
vigorous adult. 
                                                                                                                   
 1 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) 
[hereinafter LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.)].  
 2 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW, at xi (2d ed. 
1993) [hereinafter LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed.)]. 
 3 Id. at 118 n.2.  
 4 A. Watson, Law and Society, in BEYOND DOGMATICS: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE ROMAN 
WORLD 9 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2007); LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed.), 
supra note 2, at 118 n.2; see also Gary Francione, Alan Watson’s Controversial Contribution 
to Scholarship, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 61 (2002). 
 5 See infra Part IV (describing scholarly reactions to LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra 
note 1). 
 6 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Book Review, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (2000) (reviewing PATRICK 
GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD, SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (1st ed. 2000)). 
 7 See Geoffrey Samuel, All that Heaven Allows: Are Transnational Codes a “Scientific 
Truth” or Are They Just a Form of Elegant “Pastiche”?, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
165, 169–70 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012). 
 8 Chen Lei, Contextualizing Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong, in METHODS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 192. 
 9 Pier Giuseppe Monasteri, Methods in Comparative Law: An Intellectual Overview, in 
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 7, 19–22; Simone Glanert, Method?, in 
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 61, 62–63; Gary Watt, Comparison as Deep 
Appreciation, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 82, 82–84, 87, 93–94, 96–97. 
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In this Article in Alan’s honor, I shall explore the nearly forty years of 
history of Legal Transplants, tracing reactions to it, until it became judged a 
classic of comparative law—a “landmark book,” as Frances Foster described 
it in 2010.10 She considered Alan as having made with it “a major 
contribution to the field of comparative law,” one leaving “an indelible 
imprint on comparative law scholarship.”11  But, of course, forty years of 
scholarship have meant that debates have developed far beyond Alan’s initial 
discussion and, furthermore, gone in many different and unexpected 
directions. Much has recently been built on the foundations of the work, 
much—one suspects—that Alan did not anticipate.  Indeed, one may deduce 
that an idea has been successful, and stimulated considerable work, when a 
scholar could suggest in 2010 that “the study of legal transplants seems to 
have reached its saturation point.”12  But there is little to suggest that this is 
in fact the case. For instance, in the years since Meryll Dean subsequently 
refined Alan’s transplant theory in her study of jury trial in Japan,13 and 
Gilles Cuniberti commented in 2012 that “[s]ince the early work of Alan 
Watson, legal transplants have become central to the study of comparative 
law.”14  In the same year, Legal Transplants could once more be cited as a 
“seminal book.”15 The simplest search through standard data bases shows 
many more examples of continuing reliance on Alan’s work. There is life in 
the idea yet. 
I shall conclude this tribute, however, with an exploration of what one 
might call the “prehistory” of legal transplants. This will be a brief study of 
what is potentially a major topic.  Examination of an earlier discussion of a 
similar idea, reflecting on what was similar and what different, helps point 
up the significance of Alan’s work.  It also leads to reflection on why the 
idea of “legal transplants” or “transplantation of laws” seems so obvious to 
some scholars, while others remain skeptical.  The comparison will also 
throw light on the modern concept of legal transplants, reflecting on its force 
as a metaphor. 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94 MINN. L. REV. 602, 608, 
610 (2010). 
 11 Id.  
 12 Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and 
Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 
583 (2010). 
 13 See generally Meryll Dean, Legal Transplants and Jury Trial in Japan, 31 LEGAL STUD. 
570 (2011) (analyzing jury trial in Japan using Watson’s theory of legal transplants). 
 14 Gilles Cuniberti, Enhancing Judicial Reputation Through Legal Transplants: Estoppel 
Travels to France, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 383 (2012). 
 15 Maraina Pargendler, Politics in the Origin: The Making of Corporate Law in Nineteenth-
Century Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 806 (2012). 
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II.  THE EARLY HISTORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: THE BOOK AND ITS 
FIRST CRITICS 
The preface of Legal Transplants is dated Edinburgh, June 1973, and the 
title page bears the date 1974.16  There is no need to rehearse the argument of 
the book in detail, but it will be helpful if some of the main points are 
outlined.  Alan argued that the proper task of comparative law as an 
academic discipline was to explore the relationship between legal systems.17  
He claimed that there was no necessary and close connection between laws 
and the society in which they operated.18  In fact, laws were usually 
borrowed from elsewhere, so that laws often operated in societies and in 
places very different from those in which they had initially developed.  Laws 
were often strongly rooted in the past.  Transplanting of laws was easy.  All 
of this had major implications for our understanding of both legal history and 
sociology of law.  The arguments were developed through detailed historical 
examples and argument.19   
I have traced four reviews of Legal Transplants and one assessment in the 
“Books Received” section of a law journal.  An examination of these will 
show the range of immediate responses to the work; moreover, it will also 
demonstrate what were to become persistent and regular criticisms of Alan’s 
work on legal transplants.  
The first review to appear was probably that penned by Marc Ancel, a 
distinguished French judge and comparative lawyer, published in a French 
legal periodical early in 1975.20  Ancel described the contents of Legal 
Transplants and outlined Alan’s arguments in a way that indicated he 
understood them. He noted Alan’s view of that with which comparative law 
should be concerned.  Ancel referred to the paradoxical phenomenon that, 
though law was often seen as closely related to the identity of a nation or 
people, in fact transplantation of laws had been common in the ancient world 
as well as in the modern.  He appreciated the nature of Alan’s arguments 
about transplants and the relationship between legal systems.  He described 
some of the insightful observations made by Alan that he found interesting. 
He observed that the work raised the possibility of a unified legal system and 
debated some of the issues.  In his generally favourable review, he only 
regretted that Alan had not developed his methodological positions further, 
                                                                                                                   
 16 LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1, at xi.  
 17 Id. at 6.  
 18 Id. at 21–22.  
 19 Id. at 21–30. 
 20 Marc Ancel, Book Review, 27 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 303, 303–04 
(1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1). 
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commenting that this was a work that mattered in the literature on 
comparative law.21  In the summer of the same year, the work was reviewed 
by Charles Maechling.22  He considered Legal Transplants as attempting not 
“to create an expansive new approach” but instead to bring a “sharper focus 
and more rigorous analytical approach” to a field hitherto eclectic and 
narrowly empirical.23  He noted that Alan would narrow the discipline to the 
study of relationships between legal systems, made in a historical context.  
This would be done by studying the migrations or transplants of legal rules.24  
He seems to have been cautiously approving of Alan’s approach, though 
noting that it depended on his particular view of what constituted 
comparative law.  He raised some general points of his own essentially about 
problems of teaching comparative law.25  He wondered if Alan’s prescription 
was perhaps too narrow, before concluding that he wished the book were 
longer and that there had been a “greater wealth of historical example, and 
somewhat deeper elaboration of the social, political and economic context 
that must inevitably underlie his conclusions.”26  
Robert B. Seidman, Professor of Law at Boston University School of 
Law, reviewed Legal Transplants at some length in his school’s law 
journal.27  After setting out various propositions to be deduced from the 
book, he described Alan’s general “conclusions” as “either trivial or banal.”  
Seidman argued that the problem was the “positivist” methodology adopted 
that excluded consideration of “social variables”; the problem, he claimed, 
was that social factors could not be ignored, so that when they were in fact 
considered, it was “without any careful analysis or testing of hypotheses.”28  
He criticized Alan’s generation of propositions about law from specific 
historical instances.  He concluded that the book failed because of Alan’s 
“acceptance of the categories and methodology of traditional legal 
scholarship.”29  An anonymous short note in April 1975 in the Stanford Law 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Id. 
 22 Maechling was an international lawyer who had worked for the State Department, and 
who also briefly taught at the University of Virginia School of Law as a visiting professor. 
Patricia Sullivan, State Department Lawyer Charles Maechling, Jr., 87, WASH. POST, July 3, 
2007, at B8.  
 23 Charles Maechling, Book Review, 15 VA. J. INT’L L. 1037, 1038 (1974–1975) (reviewing 
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1). 
 24 Id. at 1037–38. 
 25 Id. at 1038–39.  
 26 Id. at 1039. 
 27 R.B. Seidman, Book Review, 55 B. U. L. REV. 682, 682–83 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1). 
 28 Id. at 683. 
 29 Id. at 685–87. 
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Review was also very hostile.30  It quoted Alan’s definition of legal 
transplant, and the fact that Alan thought it paradoxical that transplants of 
law were common when there was “a widespread notion” that law was an 
indicator of a people’s identity.  It noted that Alan used the idea of legal 
transplant to compare a number of legal systems.  It concluded: 
At its best . . . the book provides some not very startling 
insights into legal history that are consonant with the author’s 
view that comparative law is the study of (mainly historical) 
relationships between legal systems.  At its worst — and too 
frequently — the book falls prey to its own criticisms of 
comparative law: superficiality and lack of systematization.31 
Siedman’s reviews and the note in the Stanford Law Review establish 
what have proved to be repeated criticisms of Alan’s work regularly made by 
sociologists of law and socio-legal writers.  The most important review, 
however, was undoubtedly that by the distinguished labour lawyer, Otto 
(later Sir Otto) Kahn-Freund, who had recently retired as Professor of 
Comparative Law at Oxford.32  This is an interesting, serious, and complex 
review, to which Alan responded.  The debate between them then generated 
further discussion. 
At one level, Kahn-Freund’s review was full of praise: “this brilliant little 
book”; “it provokes thought”; “an extremely interesting book”; a book 
“replete with pungent and original observations.”33  But one suspects that, at 
another level, Kahn-Freund may have been quite disquieted by the book, and 
this, perhaps, in two ways. 
First, Kahn-Freund had delivered the second Chorley Lecture at the 
London School of Economics on June 26, 1973, under the title On Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law.34  It was published in January of the next year. 
There he had focused on comparative law as a tool of law reform.  In this 
context, he raised the questions: 
What are the uses and misuses of foreign models in the process 
of law making? What conditions must be fulfilled in order to 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Book Note, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st 
ed.), supra note 1). 
 31 Id.  
 32 Otto Kahn-Freund, Book Review, 91 L.Q.R. 292 (1975) (reviewing LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 
S (1st ed.), supra note 1). 
 33 See generally id. 
 34 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) 
[hereinafter On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law]. 
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make desirable or even make it possible for those who prepare 
new legislation to avail themselves of rules or institutions 
developed in foreign countries?35 
Kahn-Freund stated that, in the twentieth century, British legislation had 
become particularly open to foreign influences. He gave as examples 
commercial legislation of various types and family law.  He also pointed to 
examples of “the use of foreign legal patterns for the purpose of producing 
rather than responding to social change at home,” commenting that “we 
cannot be surprised that it is this use of foreign models as instruments of 
social or cultural change which raises most sharply the problem I am 
discussing — the problem of transplantation.”36 
In the late 1960s and the 1970s organ transplantation and organ rejection 
were common topics of discussion, particularly as the work of the 
charismatic and publicity-seeking Dr. Christiaan Barnard of Cape Town 
generated tremendous newspaper, radio, and television coverage, making the 
terminology of transplants popular and familiar.37  Kahn-Freund alluded to 
organ transplantation in his lecture, also referring to exchanging 
mechanisms, such as carburetors, to develop ideas of varying transferability: 
he used the metaphor to discuss a spectrum of transplantable rules from 
mechanical (easy) to organic (difficult).38  He cited Montesquieu’s views of 
the difficulty of transplanting (not of course Montesquieu’s term) the rules of 
one country to another.39  He also referred to planting in soil; but he did not 
refer to plants in the context of transplantation, though he could have, instead 
alluding to a metaphor of roots and cultivation.40 
One suspects that Kahn-Freund was pleased with his metaphor of 
transplantation, and disappointed to find that the same metaphor was 
employed at length in Alan’s book and featured in the title.41  This would be 
perfectly understandable.  Of course, as I have mentioned, discussion of 
organ transplantation was very much in the air in the late 1960s and early 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Id. at 1–2. 
 36 Id. at 2–5. 
 37 See, e.g., Progress on Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1969, at 2, available at http://se 
lect.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50613FE38581B7493C5AB1789D95F4D8685F9. 
 38 On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 6–10. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 13. 
 41 The use of the term in this way predates both Watson and Kahn-Freund.  See John W. 
Cairns, Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 131, 146, 150, 170–71 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2006).  This will be discussed further infra Part IV. 
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1970s.42  That these two individuals should have come up with it as a 
metaphor to express the borrowing of legal rules and institutions in a 
discussion of comparative law is hardly surprising.  Moreover, they were not 
alone.  In 1972, Jean Rivero, a French administrative lawyer, had considered 
the utility of the metaphor, drawn from advanced surgery, as he put it, of 
“transplant of organs,” as a means of understanding borrowing of 
administrative law.43  The next year, John Beckstrom of Northwestern 
University, an expert on law in Africa, published an article on western laws 
in Ethiopia, using the term “transplantation,” both in the title and the text.44  
While Beckstrom did not attempt to develop the term conceptually, simply 
using it as a synonym for reception, it appears neither Watson nor Kahn-
Freund were aware of this article at the time they published. 
Secondly, and more seriously, Kahn-Freund would profoundly disagree 
with Alan’s conclusions about the ease of transplanting rules.  The whole 
thrust of Legal Transplants was to argue in particular that borrowing was the 
most common mode of legal development, and that it was unnecessary for 
the borrowing system to have any real understanding of the system from 
which rules or institutions were borrowed; moreover, Alan argued, the 
longevity of rules was astonishing.  He also concluded that comparative law 
was properly about the study of the relationships between legal systems 
forged by such borrowing.  Further, from this, conclusions could be drawn 
about both the nature of law and the complexity of relationship between law 
and the society in which it operated.  The argument is careful, nuanced, and 
developed using examples; but I think the above description is not too crude 
and sums it up fairly well. 
Kahn-Freund, however, drawing on Montesquieu’s assertion that it would 
only be “un grand hazard” that one country could ever use the law of 
another, tried to develop an analysis of when borrowing could take place and 
to establish its prerequisites.45 He argued that the types of environmental 
factors that Montesquieu saw as discouraging transplanting were now much 
less significant, but that constitutional and political factors had become much 
more important.46  Kahn-Freund claimed that anyone inclined to borrow laws 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Roy Calne, History of Transplantation, 368 THE LANCET (SPECIAL ISSUE) S51 (2006); 
Thomas Schlich, The Origins of Organ Transplantation, 378 THE LANCET 1372, 1373 (2011). 
 43 Jean Rivero, Les phénomnènes d’imitation des modèles étrangers en droit administrative, 
in 2 PAGES DE DOCTRINE  459, 459 (1980).  
 44 John H. Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 557, 558, 582 
(1973). 
 45 On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 6–7. 
 46 Both Kahn-Freund and Watson use “environmental” and “environment” in a much 
broader sense, closer to their root meanings than the current contemporary uses that refer 
almost exclusively to the “natural” environment.  This very narrow usage had not yet become 
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needed to reflect on the nature of the society that generated the borrowed 
rule.  Kahn-Freund concluded: 
[W]e cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are 
transplantable.  . . . [A]ny attempt to use a pattern of law 
outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the risk 
of rejection.  The consciousness of this risk will not, I hope, 
deter legislators in this or any other country from using the 
comparative method.  All I have wanted to suggest is that its 
use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also 
of its social, and above all its political, context.  The use of 
comparative law for practical purposes becomes an abuse only 
if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context 
of the law.47 
Alan was of course arguing for such an “abuse.”  
Kahn-Freund argued in his review of Legal Transplants that “[f]rom 
Professor Watson’s own analysis there emerge two entirely different types of 
transplants,” commenting that it was “a pity that Professor Watson has not 
made their contrast more explicit.”48  The first type, according to Kahn-
Freund, was exemplified by the reception of rules on traditio; the second by 
the reception of Roman law in Scotland, which related to the politics of 
Scotland and its relationship with England in the Middle Ages.49  He 
suggested that, had Watson distinguished these types of transplants, “he 
might . . . have modified his analysis of the ease with which rules move from 
society to society.”50  One obvious point to make is that Kahn-Freund’s 
second example focused only on the borrowing system, not on the one 
borrowed form, which supports Alan’s general thesis, rather than questioning 
it.  His first example at one level could be seen as supporting his own view of 
the difficulty of transplants, and, at another, as supporting Alan’s views of 
how transplants can vary.  The review ended with two little teasing 
observations: 
And it is good to read from the pen of the Professor of Civil 
Law at Edinburgh an acknowledgement that the rules of 
                                                                                                                   
dominant in the 1970s.  By “environment” Kahn-Freund and Alan mean surrounding 
circumstances. 
 47 On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 27. 
 48 Kahn-Freund, supra note 32, at 292–93. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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English and Scottish contract law are similar in practice and 
that nothing prevents their unification or harmonization except 
the dead hand of history and the habits of thought of academic 
scholars.51 
And: 
This is a short book — too short.  One lays it aside with a vivid 
feeling of “vivant sequentes,” with a strong hope that Professor 
Watson will continue to use his immense learning for the 
elucidation of the methodological problems he has here 
approached.52 
Alan responded to Kahn-Freund in a short article published in January of 
the next year.53  He explained wherein he thought his and Kahn-Freund’s 
differences lay.  He described his own views thus: 
[S]uccessful legal borrowing could be made from a very 
different legal system, even from one at a much higher level of 
development and of a different political complexion.  What, in 
my opinion, the law reformer should be after in looking at 
foreign systems was an idea which could be transformed into 
part of the law of his country.  For this a systematic knowledge 
of the law or political structure of the donor system was not 
necessary, though a law reformer with such knowledge would 
be more efficient.  Successful borrowing could be achieved 
even when nothing was known of the political, social or 
economic context of the foreign law.54 
Not unfairly, he summed up those of Kahn-Freund in the following way: 
[His] principal thesis is that the degree to which any rule can be 
transplanted depends primarily on how closely it is linked with 
the foreign power structure.  He sets out his conclusion: “All I 
have wanted to suggest is that its use [i.e., the comparative 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Id. at 293–94 (internal quotations omitted). 
 52 Id. at 294. 
 53 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q.R. 79 (1976). 
 54 Id.  
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method] requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but 
also of its social, and above all its political context.”55 
Alan pointed out that “Montesquieu badly — very badly — underestimated 
the amount of successful borrowing which had been going on, and was going 
on, in his day.”56  He added: 
[T]he Reception [of Roman law] shows that legal rules may be 
successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, 
geographical and political circumstances of the recipient are 
very different from those of the donor system.  Indeed, the 
recipient system does not require any real knowledge of the 
social, economic, geographical and political context of the 
origin and growth of the original rule. . . . 
 [W]here a rule of Roman law was inimical to the political, 
social [sic: “geographical” intended?], economic or social 
circumstances of a later state, its chances of being borrowed by 
that later state would be greatly diminished.  But this reduced 
possibility of being borrowed existed . . . usually only when the 
rule was inimical and not also when the Roman context of the 
rule was simply different from the circumstances prevailing in 
the later state. . . . [O]ne might deduce the proposition: 
“However historically conditioned their origins might be, rules 
of private law in their continuing lifetime have no inherent 
close relationship with a particular people, time or place.”57 
Alan emphasized that his disagreement with Kahn-Freund was with the 
latter’s view that “the degree to which any rule can be borrowed depends on 
how closely it is linked with the foreign power structure and that the use of 
the comparative method requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law but 
also of its political context.”58  He emphasized that the focus in borrowing 
should be on the system doing the borrowing.59  He stated that he was “not 
entirely persuaded by the opinion that environmental factors are now less 
important, political factors more important, in determining difficulties for a 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. at 79–80 (quoting On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 27). 
 56 Id. at 80. 
 57 Id. at 80–81 (quoting On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, supra note 34, at 2). 
 58 Id. at 82. 
 59 See id. (explaining that looking at Irish power structure would predict the failure of 
English-style divorce law in Ireland). 
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legal transplant.”60  He further argued that general laws in large and diverse 
modern states may be more easily transplantable than those of the small 
jurisdictions with which Montesquieu was familiar.61 
There was no further response from Kahn-Freund.  While he was not to 
die until 1979, and remained active as a scholar, he did not return to the 
topic.62  The debate was picked up in 1977, however, by Professor Eric Stein 
of the Law School of the University of Michigan in an article honoring a 
colleague, A. Brunson MacChesnay, who was retiring from the Law School 
of Northwestern University.63  Stein summed up the views of the two 
scholars quite fairly.  He drew a distinction between them, classifying the 
approach of Kahn-Freund as that of “a Lawyer-Sociologist” and that of Alan 
as that of a “Legal Historian.”64  In drawing this distinction, Stein wished to 
emphasize that Alan tended to take a “macro-legal” view, contemplating “the 
massive transplants that loom as milestones on the large-scale canvas of 
world history,” while Kahn-Freund adopted a “micro-legal” view, 
concentrating on modern law reform.65  He was evidently not inclined to 
accept the accuracy of Alan’s perception that transplants were easy: he gave 
as an example the attempts of modern industrial states to reform their 
company laws, focusing on Germany and France in the (then) European 
Economic Community.  He also suggested that what may appear to be 
transplants may be examples of parallel developments.66  He raised some 
appropriate questions about the definitions of “environmental” and 
“political” factors, and questioned how realistic would be the vision of the 
reformer “on a tour d’horizon of foreign legal systems plucking ideas from 
‘black letter’ rules in complete ignorance of how such rules came to operate 
as ‘living law’ and where they fit into the legal system.”67  He claimed that 
Kahn-Freund had shown that, had British legislators examined how 
collective bargaining worked in the U.S.A., they might have realized that 
transplanting certain American concepts into British law would lead to their 
rejection.68  This example, however, is in many ways as much in favor of 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Id. at 83. 
 61 Id. at 83–84. 
 62 W. [Lord Wedderburn of Charlton], Professor Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, 42 MOD. L. REV. 
609 (1979).  For a list of his publications, see Schriftenverzeichnis–Bibliography, in IN 
MEMORIAM SIR OTTO KAHN-FREUND 783 (Franz Gamillscheg et al. eds., 1980). 
 63 Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198 
(1977). 
 64 Id. at 199–203. 
 65 Id. at 203–04. 
 66 Id. at 204–07. 
 67 Id. at 207–09. 
 68 Id. at 208–09. 
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Alan’s as Kahn-Freund’s opinion.  Stein also wondered how much Turkish 
and Japanese borrowers knew about the systems from which they borrowed, 
concluding that: “It may well be that where the law maker lacks private or 
governmental institutional arrangements for a systematic use of the 
comparative method, his way of drawing on foreign law, if he considers it at 
all, corresponds to Watson’s idea.”69  He concluded by questioning how 
common was the use of the comparative method in law reform, giving as 
instances practices in the United States, while ending with an emphasis on 
the significance of comparative studies for legal education.70 
  
III.  FURTHER DEVELOPMENT: SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 
In the same year as Stein’s article appeared, Alan published Society and 
Legal Change, in which he further developed his ideas about the longevity of 
legal rules.71  In the preface, dated April 1976, he noted that Kahn-Freund 
had read a draft and discussed it with him.72  Alan’s general thrust was that 
laws in the West were generally out-of-step with the needs and desires of 
society because of a general inertia.  He argued that this showed that most 
current theories of law and society were implausible and that private law 
rules played little part in promoting the health and well-being of society.73  
Alan developed this argument through discussions of Roman law (notably of 
contracts and patria potestas), English real property, and libel and slander in 
England, before reflecting on what he described as “legal scaffolding” 
(elaborate systems of modification to support existing rules and make them 
workable), legal transplants, and divergence.  In a chapter of conclusions he 
emphasized the implausibility of most current theories of law and society, 
and once more emphasized the general lack of a direct link between law and 
the society it served.  He concluded with some remarks about the 
significance of codification as raising questions about whether it can abolish 
legal scaffolding and remove legal divergence.74   
In a final chapter he set out two possible approaches to studying the 
causes of legal development.  The first was to study a country’s laws during 
a period when it underwent rapid change.  The second would be to study the 
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relationship through borrowing between legal systems.  He gave as a brief 
example the development of law out of the Roman actio de pauperie.75  He 
pointed out:  
Every time a change is deliberately made a choice has been 
exercised.  Often the retention of a legal rule is also the result 
of choice.  To isolate the factors in the choices which are made 
is to go a long way towards understanding how law develops 
and also how law is in fact related to its society. . . . Yet the 
lesson of the preceding chapters is precisely that in explaining 
legal development the isolation of factors such as those just 
listed is in general not enough.  That can tell us why the 
particular development occurred, and not some other; but it 
does not explain why development occurred at all, or at that 
precise time.  For that we must search for the impetus which 
was strong enough to overcome the law’s inertia.76 
 The reviews were uniformly unfavorable.  J.N. (John) Adams, an 
English property lawyer and legal historian, described the work’s 
“fundamental weakness” as attempting “to make a sociological thesis 
without using a sociologist’s methodology,” which he described as “a trap 
into which it is all too easy for a historian to fall.”77  He distinguished 
sociology from history, using the example of the work of Max Weber, and 
argued that Alan attempted “to generalise from [some sequences of historical 
events] a sociological theory.  It does not work.”78  He suggested that Alan 
had misused a variety of sociological concepts in an atheoretical way, 
concluding that “[w]hen it is all boiled down, the defensible parts of the 
thesis of Society and Legal Change amount to very little.”79  He softened this 
at the end, writing that, “as a work of history, this book is stimulating, 
amusing, and sometimes brilliant . . . . It is not however an important 
contribution to the sociological study of law and society.”80 
Lawrence Friedman of the Stanford Law School also reviewed the book.81  
A well-known sociologist of law as well as historian of American law, 
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Friedman was in many ways an obvious choice as a reviewer, since he was 
noted for his treatment of American law as closely related to American 
society.82  In the preface to the first edition (1973) of his History of American 
Law, he had written: 
This is a social history of American law.  I have tried to fight 
free of jargon, legal and sociological, but I have surrendered 
myself wholeheartedly to some of the central insights of social 
science.  This book treats American law, then, not as a 
kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as 
the province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society.  It 
takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, 
everything as relative and molded by economy and society.83 
This was apparently as far from Alan’s approach as one could get.  Further, 
in Society and Legal Change, Alan had even stated explicitly that his theory 
was directly in conflict with that of Friedman.84 
Friedman’s review of the book is, indeed, as one would have anticipated.  
He states that the book “sets forth a single, rather simple thesis,” namely that 
“law can be and often is seriously out of phase with society.”85  This meant it 
“casts doubt on theories which suggest some kind of close organic 
connection between law and society.  This puts Watson in opposition to most 
sociologists of law, and indeed to most current theorists of law.”86  The book, 
he noted, was largely made up of examples to prove the thesis.  He 
commented: “To be blunt, I find the thesis quite unconvincing.”87  He 
suggested that Alan focused on trivial or fringe issues that no one bothered 
about.  Friedman made some good points, suggesting, for example, that the 
reason the law ended up irrational and muddled was because it was “subject 
to conflicting social and economic pressures,” with which Alan would 
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probably have agreed.88  He criticized Alan as having a rather narrow notion 
of law.  He agreed that laws were borrowed, but that choice was often 
involved (which Alan would not have denied).  Friedman finished with an 
attack on academic lawyers who tended, he thought, to focus on peripheral or 
freak topics.  His attitude can readily be gathered by the metaphor he used: 
The book, in my opinion, is fundamentally wrong: yet the error 
is quite understandable.  If a person spends his life 
embroidering and decorating some little swatch of material, it 
is no use telling him he has wasted his time on a useless rag.  
The business of academic lawyers revolves about the minute 
dissection of rules only remotely connected with living, 
breathing law.  These rules are found in the “general part” of 
the codes, or (in the common-law world) are often generalized 
from rare and wholly peripheral lawsuits, arising out of freak 
circumstances.89 
Friedman’s classification of academic law—and perhaps indeed, given his 
following paragraph about the actio de pauperie, especially of Roman law—
as a kind of glass bead game, indicates his stance. 
Aubrey L. Diamond, whose special field was consumer credit and hire 
purchase, was another reviewer, chosen no doubt because of his academic 
focus on a “practical” and contemporary field and his work as a member of 
the English Law Commission.90  He was also Director of the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies in London.  After a general description of the 
contents of the book, Diamond asked: “How far do the examples given by 
Professor Watson support his proposition that the law has been much out of 
step with society?”91  He replied: “I would find it easier to answer that 
question if I knew what it meant to say that law is out of step with society.”92  
He commented: “[I]t seems an unduly pretentious phrase to describe some of 
the defects in English or Roman law given by the author.”93  Like Friedman, 
he criticized Alan’s focus on detail.  To make sense, he argued, it would need 
to be “pitched at the level of . . . broad constitutional or political issues.”94  
But he conceded much more to Alan than Friedman had.  He thought that if 
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all that Alan meant was that the law is imperfect, then “his case is more 
persuasive.”95  He added: 
This book supports the views expressed in Legal Transplants 
(1974) and to some extent overlaps the earlier work.  If the 
laws of one country can be adopted by another, it becomes 
difficult to argue that, for the adopting country at any rate, law 
arises from the common consciousness of the people.  Would it 
make any substantial difference to the life of the man in the 
street if the whole of English law concerned with contracts, 
commerce, torts and property were replaced overnight by that 
of France or Germany?96 
As late as 1982, Society and Legal Change rated a twenty-four page 
review essay by Richard Abel, a noted “law and society” scholar at 
U.C.L.A., much of whose work has focused on the legal profession and the 
provision of legal services.97  Abel commented that Alan had “built upon his 
vast knowledge of legal history to offer a social theory of law.”98  He 
suggested that Alan’s concept of law was vague and confused and that his 
“conception of society [was] even more problematic.”99  He claimed that 
Alan rejected “the study of legal institutions and processes in order to 
concentrate upon substantive rules, and he personifies society so as to render 
unnecessary any analysis of the political ideas or behaviour of particular 
individuals or groups.”100 Abel also attacked Alan’s “antitheoretical stance,” 
on the basis of which he considered Alan criticized three types of social 
theories.  He judged that Alan showed what connects them: the assumption 
that “harmony between law and society is natural and attainable.”101  But he 
claimed that Alan caricatured each theory in order to “expose their common 
error.”102  He argued that, “in reacting against the prevailing theoretical 
framework, Watson has not escaped it but merely turned it upside down,” 
and that his own position “is a mirror image of the functionalism he 
attacks.”103  He suggested that Alan seemed to be “an unconfessed 
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utilitarian.”104  He saw part of the problem also lying in the restricted scope 
of Alan’s investigations.105 
Abel concluded with an attack on Alan’s politics (as he deduced them 
from what he perceived to be Alan’s social theory).  He claimed of Alan’s 
account of law: “What is singularly lacking in his view is any notion that law 
ought to lead society, ought to be an instrument for radical change, from 
which I in infer that he opposes such change.”106  The inference, of course, 
does not follow; but I think this explains why Abel reviewed this work in this 
fashion so many years after its publication.  In the very year Society and 
Legal Change was published, Abel had been one of the founders of the 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies.107  The quotation from Abel sums up 
much of what united the disparate groups that made up this very self-
conscious and self-important movement.108  By 1982, Alan was in the 
U.S.A., teaching at the prestigious Law School of the University of 
Pennsylvania, and the Critical Legal Studies movement was approaching its 
height.  Abel and others who identified with Critical Legal Studies will have 
sensed that Alan’s scholarship was not sympathetic to their views and 
political aims.  Abel’s review in many ways seems to adopt the technique of 
“trashing,” as it was called, ferreting out and exposing the “contradictions” 
supposedly in Alan’s theoretical approach.  It was a technique much favored 
by scholars who identified with Critical Legal Studies.109  On the basis of 
this, he described Alan as having a “basically conservative world view.”110  
According to Abel, this was connected with Watson’s “apolitical 
interpretation.”  Indeed, “[t]hose who have denied the existence of pattern 
and necessity in history . . . have been political conservatives seeking to 
confute radicals, notably Marx and later Marxists, who maintain that 
historical trends do exist and should be used to further progressive 
causes.”111  At the end of the review, Abel appears to return to a more 
traditional social science critique, analogous to those of Society and Legal 
Change that had already appeared.  He wrote: “Recent social studies of law 
are impoverished by their parochial focus on contemporary legal institutions 
within a single country.  Our theories could be enormously enriched by 
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comparative and historical scholarship.  But that scholarship must meet the 
canons of contemporary social science.”112  But the agenda of Critical Legal 
Studies was further revealed when Abel wrote: 
 The starting point must be a statement of values, for the 
scholar’s vision of the good society influences not only what he 
deems worthy of study but also the kind of explanations he will 
entertain.  Some epistemological position must also be chosen 
and adhered to rigorously. . . . These preliminary decisions will 
largely determine the theory of society with which the 
investigator begins. . . . 
 Comparative law and legal history no longer can be, indeed 
no longer are, content to confine themselves to doctrinal 
analysis of positive law.  But the social theory of law cannot be 
a mere adjunct to doctrinal analysis, a series of qualifications 
tacked on to an enterprise that otherwise remains unchanged.  
Furthermore, social theory, if taken seriously, forces us to 
confront the political content that is inextricably involved in 
any account of law and, a fortiori, in any prescription for 
reform.113  
Alan would have largely agreed with Abel’s final sentence: “Studies using 
historical and comparative materials to construct a social theory of when and 
why legal rules are preserved under changed social conditions, and assessing 
that persistence in terms of explicitly stated values, would be a major 
contribution.”114  But he would have thought that this is what he had indeed 
achieved in these books and a number of related articles. 
By placing Abel’s critique of Alan’s work in the context of the Critical 
Legal Studies movement, I should not be taken as thereby trying to devalue 
the critique; rather, I suspect it explains why the review appeared so long 
after the book had appeared.  In a period when attitudes in the strongly 
politicized U.S. Law Schools—with stiff competition for jobs in elite 
institutions—were very polarized, Alan’s work presented a target, and the 
review offered Abel a way of making some points about the aims of Critical 
Legal Studies, while also criticizing a scholar who was not “one of us.”115 
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Several years before Abel’s review, Alan had already developed his ideas 
further in two important articles.  The first was devoted to improving law-
making.116  It was an example of what might nowadays be called “blue skies” 
thinking.  He set out a basic agenda: 
The extent to which a source of law is “satisfactory” should be 
judged . . . by three tests.  First, how responsive is the law to 
the serious needs and desires of the community?  The more 
easily a source of law allows law to change when society 
undergoes change, the better the source of law.  Secondly, how 
comprehensible is the law to the persons affected by it?  The 
more comprehensible the law, the more satisfactory the source 
of law.  Thirdly, how comprehensive is the law?  The more 
certainly the existing law can provide an answer to the legal 
problems that arise the more satisfactory is the source of law. 
Typically a tension exists between the ease of comprehension 
of law and its comprehensiveness.117 
He argued that the way to secure this was to have “tiered law.”  The first 
rank law would be in the form of a code; the second rank would be both law 
and commentary.  The front rank law, according to which legal decisions had 
to be made, had to be comprehensible, like the French Code civil, so that 
ordinary citizens could understand it.  The second rank law provided the 
interpretation and detail, and had to be comprehensive, like commentaries on 
the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.118  Problems would be referred to an 
interpretative committee.119  If a problem were novel, as Alan pointed out, 
precedents or analogies could be found in the civil law systems and the 
Corpus iuris civilis itself.120  He applied the idea to an independent Scotland, 
no doubt because the article originated in an address to the Andrew Fletcher 
Society in Edinburgh.121 
The second article, dedicated to Otto Kahn-Freund, was more obviously 
on point, and was very clearly a development and clarification of the themes 
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found in Legal Transplants.122  Starting with an explicit rejection of 
Friedman’s position, Alan asserted: 
Societies vary greatly, and so do legal rules.  A perennial 
question is “Do legal rules reflect a society’s desires, needs and 
aspirations?”  The answer which is normally given or is just 
assumed is positive though minor qualifications are usually 
urged.  And yet, the two most startling, and at the same time 
most obvious, characteristics of legal rules are the apparent 
ease with which they can be transplanted from one system to 
another, and their capacity for long life.  With transmission or 
the passing of time modifications may well occur, but 
frequently the alterations in the rules have only limited 
significance.123 
He gave the reception and spread of the Roman and English laws as obvious 
examples.  They were applied to populations at different times and in 
different places without any real problems.  The longevity of rules was 
“equally striking.”124  He argued that these two characteristics—transplants 
and longevity—could also be identified in the structure of legal systems.125  
He argued that comparative law should be the study of the relationship 
between systems created by borrowing.  He compared it in this respect to the 
study of comparative linguistics, claiming it should lead to a theory about 
law, through study of transplants.  He went on to isolate and identify the 
factors that he considered influenced borrowing.  One of the most significant 
was that of the role of lawyers in shaping the law.126 
Alan concluded this article by arguing that: 
To isolate the general factors at work in legal change it might, 
in fact, be appropriate to seize a decisive moment, such as 
codification and explain why it occurred at all, why in that 
territory it occurred at the time it did and not before, why the 
code was either a new creation for that territory or was 
borrowed in large measure or virtually entire from elsewhere; 
and of the latter, why the particular model was selected.  
                                                                                                                   
 122 Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 313 n.* 
(1978). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 313–14. 
 125 Id. at 314–15. 
 126 Id. at 321–34. 
658  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 41:637 
 
Likewise it could be important to explain the absence of 
codification in other systems.127 
Here he pointed to the potential significance of study of codification in 
Louisiana, also adding that study of codifying in Quebec would also be 
fruitful.128 In Quebec, as in Louisiana, the code basically followed the 
structure of that of France, but the law to be codified was that of Lower 
Canada, that is to say law based on the Coutume de Paris.  Alan raised a 
variety of questions, such as: Why were the codes of Louisiana and Quebec 
relatively independent in substance from the French code, while later 
European and Latin-American codes sometimes followed it “slavishly?”  
Why was the law not codified in systems such as South Africa, Texas, or 
Scotland?129  Alan had already argued in Legal Transplants that study of the 
early legal history of Louisiana was potentially of great interest to a 
comparativist, because of the obviously massive borrowing found in the 
Louisiana Civil Code.130 
IV.  REACTIONS IN THE LITERATURE, 1974–1985 
It is here necessary that I should interject a personal note.  In October 
1973 I matriculated as a law student in the University of Edinburgh.  One of 
my first-year subjects was Civil Law—Civil law, of course, in the sense of 
the ius civile, the law of Rome.  Alan then held the chair that I now have the 
honor to occupy, that of Civil Law.  Alan, who has always relished teaching, 
taught much of the course, lecturing in the spell-binding and charismatic way 
his pupils recall.  After an account of the law of Rome structured according 
to Justinian’s Institutes, the year-long course finished, as indeed it still does, 
with an introduction to the Reception of Roman law, with a particular focus 
on Scotland.  In the year of my attendance, the lectures on the Reception—
though I did not then realize it—were drawn from the discussion in Legal 
Transplants.  As a third-year student, in 1975–1976, I took the honors course 
in Comparative Law.  The theoretical part of the course was taught by Alan, 
debating the views on comparative law found in Legal Transplants.  I, for 
one, was convinced, and indeed wrote an essay on the transplanting of 
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Roman water law to such different places as the Netherlands and then South 
Africa.131  In my final undergraduate year, 1976–1977, I enrolled in the 
honors course in Civil Law, most of which was taught by Alan, with a 
section on the Reception taught by Sandy McCall Smith (who had also 
taught part of Comparative Law).  A large part of the course was devoted to 
a detailed consideration of D. 9.2 (ad legem Aquiliam); there was also a 
section on the Twelve Tables.  Alan had just published Rome of the Twelve 
Tables, and he had a definite liking for teaching what he was researching.132  
I wrote an essay tracing the development of clause pénale in the French 
Code civil out of the Roman stipulatio poenae, perhaps indicating I was 
developing more as a general legal historian than as a specialist scholar of 
Roman law. 
I then decided that I wished to study for the degree of Ph.D. with Alan, 
examining the idea of legal transplants.  Initially, I had thought of working 
on law in South Africa; but this was at a time when visiting there could be 
problematic.  Alan instead suggested that I look at codification in Louisiana 
and Quebec, following up the observation he had made in Legal Transplants, 
and indeed reflecting what he was to say in his article on transplants in 1978.  
I enrolled in 1977, writing a thesis with the descriptive—if cumbersome—
title of “The 1808 Digest of Orleans and 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada: 
An Historical Study of Legal Change.”  I made a detailed study of the 
composition of parts of the two codes, focusing on the activities and choices 
of the codifiers, drawing conclusions on what this told us about law.  The 
dissertation was submitted in December 1980, and I graduated in 1981.133  I 
did not then pursue this specific line of research further, though much of my 
subsequent work has clearly developed out of various themes in my doctoral 
dissertation, and I have published subsequently on the history of law in 
Louisiana.134  I did not publish my dissertation, other than developing part as 
an article on employment in the Civil Code of Lower Canada in a special 
issue of the McGill Law Journal devoted to the history of the law in 
Quebec.135  The publication of René David’s Tagore Law Lectures in 1980, 
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however, did lead me to venture into the theoretical field of comparative law 
and legal transplants.136  I wrote an essay disagreeing with David’s argument 
for a new ius commune to be created at a doctrinal level by scholars of 
comparative law working together.137  In many ways, although he was not 
talking specifically of what later become known as the European Union, his 
argument foreshadowed some current concerns in Europe.  I was skeptical 
for a variety of reasons, arguing that study of legal transplants suggested that 
a variety of cultural factors might prevent this.  I drew on my research in 
Louisiana and Quebec, as well as discussing two authors in whom I was to 
become very interested, Lord Kames and Sir William Blackstone. 
As Alan’s pupil, I might well be expected to take his ideas and insights 
seriously; but there are indications that Alan’s ideas of legal transplants had 
some wider impact from the beginning.  His perception may now be that 
Legal Transplants was either ignored or excoriated in the period immediately 
following its publication: hence his comment on its falling “stillborn from 
the press.”  This, of course, is an allusion to David Hume’s famous comment 
that his Treatise “fell dead-born from the press.”138  Hume had added, 
however, that his work did not reach “such distinction, as even to excite a 
murmur among the zealots.”139  I think, however, that Alan would agree, 
judging by the reviews already discussed, that his work did excite murmurs 
among those whom he would class as zealots, and its successor, Society and 
Legal Change, perhaps even more so.  But, if not completely ignored, Legal 
Transplants probably did not generate as much discussion as Alan had 
initially hoped in the first decade or so after publication; but it certainly 
generated some.  Without claiming to make a comprehensive survey of 
discussion in this period, and without revisiting the highly critical and 
dismissive reviews already discussed, some trends may be identified.  While 
there may have been doubters, much of what Alan said can be seen as having 
been accepted—increasingly so as the years went by—until it became simply 
received knowledge and “legal transplant” a normal term.  This seems to 
have happened by the middle years of the 1980s. 
Stein’s distinction of Alan’s and Kahn-Freund’s approaches to legal 
transplants, as being between those of a “Legal Historian” and a “Lawyer-
Sociologist,” evidently resonated.  And many subsequent scholars “read” 
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their differences in a similar fashion.140  We have noted the attitudes 
expressed in reviews of Society and Legal Change by Adams, Friedman, and 
Diamond, who could be classified as “Lawyer-Sociologists.”  Thus, in 1982, 
Christopher Whelan explored the introduction of the emergency procedures 
under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 in an article on labor law very 
strongly influenced by the thinking of Kahn-Freund, who had recently died, 
and whom he acknowledged at the end.141  As a case-study of transplants, 
Whelan argued that these provisions had been drawn from U.S. law, arguing 
that the differences between the two systems of labor law meant that the 
American provisions could not be transferred successfully.  He pointed out 
that Alan’s views on legal transplants differed from those of Kahn-Freund, 
and that Alan had argued “that the domestic law reformer need only look for 
an idea which could be transformed into domestic law, for which a 
systematic knowledge of the law or political structure of the donor system 
was not necessary (though law reform might be more efficient if such 
knowledge was obtained).”142  Whelan did not comment on whether he 
considered that Alan had been refuted; but his subtle and sophisticated study 
could lead to an argument either way.  In 1984, Michael Bridge cited Kahn-
Freund, but not Alan, on transplants, to the effect that it was “dangerous and 
disruptive to believe that the comparative legal method can be used to justify 
highly selective legal transplants without regard to the  whole of a country’s 
legal tradition.”143  This was more in the way of a passing remark than 
anything else, but it is evidently contrary to Alan’s view. 
In contrast, legal historians seem often to have been more broadly 
sympathetic to Alan’s arguments or at least to have recognized the potential 
they held and to have demonstrated a willingness to engage with them.  In 
1975, Hans Baade suggested that “a study of the history of the form of 
marriage in Spanish North America [was] likely to afford new insights into 
the question of the comparative viability of ‘legal transplants.’ ”144  In 
discussing the Roman law of guardianship in England in 1978, R.H. 
Helmholz asked whether it was possible to talk of a “legal transplant.”145  In 
1979, citing both Legal Transplants and Society and Legal Change, Charles 
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Donahue simply accepted that “[l]egal ideas can be transplanted from 
societies with one set of legal institutions and social structures to societies 
with quite different institutions and structures.”146 
In this period, one of the most important discussions of transplants, which 
foreshadowed much more recent debate, was by John Henry Merryman, the 
distinguished comparative lawyer and expert on cultural property.  In May, 
1977, in a colloquium devoted to the possibility of a “Common Law of 
Europe,” at the newly established European University Institute at Badia 
Fiesolana just outside Florence, Merryman presented a paper entitled “On the 
Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law.”147  
In this he turned to the debate involving Kahn-Freund and Alan (Merryman 
also was aware of Beckstrom’s piece), devoting a subsection to legal 
transplants in his section on “Strategies of Convergence.”148  Citing Legal 
Transplants in general fashion, Merryman commented that “[l]egal 
transplantation has a long history.”149  He cited a series of examples of 
transplantation, including from Beckstrom’s work, before commenting that 
“[l]egal transplants across the Civil law-Common law boundary obviously 
lead in the direction of convergence of the two systems.”150  He concluded 
his discussion of transplants by commenting that “[m]ost fundamental is the 
completely unresolved question whether ‘successful’ transplants are 
beneficial or detrimental in their impact.”151  He noted that: 
The entire topic has recently been revived by Professors 
Beckstrom and Watson and by the colloquy between Professor 
Watson and Professor Kahn-Freund.  One important, and 
fundamental, aspect of that debate involves a differing 
assessment of history.  Enthusiasts for transplantation point to 
the reception of West European codes in China, Japan, Turkey 
and Ethiopia.  Skeptics argue that these “receptions” were only 
partially successful at best, took an enormous effort and 
investment of resources, and may have been both less effective 
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and more costly than alternative strategies of law reform.  
There is no obvious way to resolve this issue.152 
His point is in many ways intellectually akin to that made by Eric Stein about 
whether one is a “Legal Historian” or a “Lawyer-Sociologist.”153  Different 
disciplines were predisposing scholars to different answers. 
A number of writers were obviously familiar with the debate between 
Alan and Kahn-Freund, but did not follow Stein’s and Merryman’s attempts 
to engage with it.  Thus, in 1981, Pnina Lahav, raised as a question: “What 
are the effects of transplantation on the development of indigenous 
constitutional law?” A footnote commented: “The debate about the 
feasibility of organic as compared with mechanic transplantation had begun 
with Montesquieu and continues to this day,” citing Kahn-Freund’s article of 
1974, and Alan’s of 1976.154  While not substantially relying on Kahn-
Freund or Alan’s works, Lahav’s article fruitfully used the concept of a legal 
transplant throughout to make a powerful analysis of the transplantation and 
rejection of American law in Israel.  The author concluded that: 
Transplantation of American law, however, has been less than 
successful.  The transplantor’s solid knowledge of the donor 
system, sensitivity to the need of organic integration of foreign 
law into the recipient system and mastery of judicial 
decisionmaking [sic] techniques, may help in building 
resistance to rejection, but they are not enough.  It is one thing 
to compress the jurisprudence of the First Amendment into one 
Israeli decision and weave it into the local system so that it 
gains a potential to become an organic part of it.  It is another 
thing to persuade other judges or to follow the same route. 
Judicial philosophies — legal formalism or sociological 
jurisprudence — are decisive determinants.  Political visions, 
as molded by the particular history of the recipient, inevitably 
affect the choice of the transplantor.155 
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But Lahav did not reflect on the debate between Kahn-Freund and Alan, nor 
did she draw general conclusions about transplants and transplanting as a 
phenomenon.  
Other scholars simply accepted the lessons of Legal Transplants 
apparently without examination.  For example, in 1979, Basil Edwards, after 
making glancing references to transplants in the footnotes to an article on 
choice of law in delict, finally relied on Alan’s arguments on transplants to 
support the view that it should be possible in integrate law of an origin other 
than Roman-Dutch into the law of South Africa.156  Another South African 
scholar, Ben Beinart, referred to Legal Transplants in a posthumously 
published, unfinished paper (of 1979) printed in 1982.157  As Alan had 
recognized, southern Africa provided fertile ground for the study of 
transplants, and in 1982 an article on divorce reform in Botswana made that 
point clearly.158  But study of Federal rules of procedure could also be 
influenced by the ideas in Legal Transplants.  This, in 1982, Stephen 
Burbank, in a lengthy historical and contemporary analysis of the (Federal) 
Rules Enabling Act of 1933, published in May 1982, noted that a model had 
been used with a tradition quite different from that of the Federal system.159 
Quoting Legal Transplants, he commented: 
[T]he lessons of comparative law should make us wary of a 
hasty conclusion that the supporters’ choice of a model doomed 
their effort to confusion.  For “usually legal rules are not 
peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now 
operate and . . . this is not a matter of great concern.”160 
Burbank acknowledged Alan’s assistance in reading a draft of this article.161  
In another article on procedure published in December of that year, Burbank 
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again drew on insights from Legal Transplants, noting that “borrowing 
impeded procedural innovation.”162 
Of course, some authors simply cited Legal Transplants for a point it 
contained on comparative law or legal history, rather than for any general or 
theoretical claims it may have contained.  In this way, Gregory Alexander 
cited it in 1976 for the observation that language difficulties can cause 
problems for the unwary in comparison.163  Likewise Legal Transplants 
could be cited for the observation that the interpretation of rules can vary 
over time.164  An author could rely on it for Alan’s comments on codification 
and despotism.165  David Carey Miller cited Alan’s discussion of the 
interrelationship of the laws of New Zealand and England in 1980.166  
Sometimes Legal Transplants could be referred to for its perceptive 
historical observations.167  It provided one author with part of a footnote on 
the laws of colonial Massachusetts.168  R.J. Schoeck could enjoy Alan’s pithy 
reformulation of a famous apothegm of Holmes.169  In a debate on the future 
of public international law, both Kahn-Freund and Alan could be cited on 
transplants for a debate on the evolutionary development of law.170  While 
not involving an engagement with the theoretical issues raised by Legal 
Transplants, these uses show the growing level of currency in the literature 
that the book was achieving, a currency underlined by its choice as a book, 
“selected at random” in 1978, as an exemplar of books that are “valuable 
sources of inspiration and authority for the creative lawyer and jurist.”171  
One notable effect was the slow but sure spread of the terminology of 
“legal transplant,” sometimes without a mention of the work of either Alan 
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or Kahn-Freund (or indeed Beckstrom).  The term was used by Torres in 
1976, in a study of the Puerto Rican penal code: neither author was 
mentioned, and there were no citations of their works.172  In 1981, Daniel 
Coquillette, in an article on the English Civilians, described them as 
believing that “ideas about law were eminently suitable for transplanting.”173  
In the same year, Julio Menezes, in an article on the support of legal 
institutions in an impoverished society, talked of “ill-fated and pernicious 
legal transplants” also without any reference.174  Three years later, Douglas 
Hay, discussing the history and historiography of criminal prosecution in 
England, wrote that Canadian historians “are more apt to be aware of legal 
transplants, imposition of law, recourse to martial law, and the slow and 
contradictory way English law became part of our culture.”175  Another 
author simply remarked that the term “legal transplants” was used “virtually 
interchangeably” for “reception theory,” “borrowing,” and incorporation.176  
The author shared Kahn-Freund’s view of the feasibility of transplants, 
however, rather than Alan’s.177  There is no way of knowing whether or not 
these authors were conscious or aware of the debate between Alan and Kahn-
Freund—it is difficult to believe that at least some of them were not.  Given 
the topics of their respective articles, a discussion of the matter would have 
been illuminating.  But what these uses of the terminology demonstrate is its 
increasing familiarity and the comfort of writers in its use, reflecting the way 
discussions of legal transplants were starting to become routine in the later 
1970s. 
Alan himself had continued to contribute on the topic.  In 1977, he 
published The Nature of Law, a book in which he argued that what 
distinguished law was the existence of processes to resolve disputes and 
promote order that could be backed by force.178  In the work he devoted a 
chapter to the importance of the legal profession in any understanding of law 
and society.  He there argued that law was often developed by borrowing, 
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and explained the factors that influenced this practice in specific cases.179  
The book received some reviews, but otherwise did not generate much 
discussion.180  Alan next published The Making of the Civil Law in 1981.181  
In this he explored why the civil law countries differed from one another, 
despite the common foundation of their legal systems in Roman law; but he 
again saw the answer to this question as rooted in the activities of lawyers, 
and the historical traditions of particular systems, rejecting what one might 
call instrumental explanations of legal change.  This book was much more 
extensively reviewed, particularly in North America, perhaps reflecting its 
publication by Harvard University Press and Alan’s move to the Law School 
of the University of Pennsylvania.  It is too crude to say that legal historians 
liked it, while others did not; but reviews were certainly mixed.182  In the 
same year, he summarized in a short article his main points about the “forces 
that control legal change.”183  He concluded that “[w]hile the legal tradition 
plays a fundamental role in legal change, legal rules, structures, and 
institutions are often greatly out of step with western society,” and that this 
had important implications in undertaking satisfactory law reform.184  A 
much more developed argument was presented in 1983, in which he 
synthesized his views, answered critics, and stressed the importance of the 
specific culture of legal élites.185  All of these themes were developed in two 
further books, Sources of Law, Legal Change and Ambiguity and The 
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Evolution of Law.186  These received fewer reviews; but again these were 
mixed and varying.187 
If these further developments of Alan’s ideas continued to receive often 
skeptical reviews, by the date of the publication of these last-mentioned two 
books, the idea and terminology of legal transplants had become standard.  In 
1978, the reviewer of The Impact of American Law on English and 
Commonwealth Law (1978) wrote that “transplantation of law is a common 
historical occurrence,” citing Alan, Kahn-Freund, and Stein.188  As the string 
of citations for the propositions suggests, he did not feel the need to 
investigate the issue further.  In 1981, Merryman’s paper of 1977 that in part 
discussed transplants was reprinted in an American law review.189  By 1982, 
Edward Wise could open an article on comparative law with the Watsonian 
comment: “Comparative law is concerned with relationships between legal 
systems.  It has been said: no relationship, no comparative law.”190  His 
authority for this was Legal Transplants.191  In the same year, Paul Jackson 
commented that “[t]he longevity and capacity of legal rules to take root in 
alien soil have been made commonplace by Watson,” also citing Legal 
Transplants.192  Again in 1982, Judith Wegner, seemingly unaware of others’ 
use of the term, in discussing Islamic jurists’ borrowing form Talmudic law, 
asked whether this was “in a word, an instance of what Alan Watson has 
felicitously called ‘legal transplants’?”193  When Maurice Tancelin used the 
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term “legal transplant” in 1984, it required no citation or explanation.194  The 
book itself was simply becoming regarded as a standard or classic work on 
comparative law. 
Assisting the spread of the influence of Alan’s thinking on transplants 
was the fact that, almost contemporaneously, some continental European 
scholars had started to develop a very similar approach.  In 1972, Jean 
Rivero had pointed out that a state, whether historic or modern, could create 
its own administrative legal structures or could copy those of another state.  
The latter was the most common practice, he stated.195  He debated how this 
should be characterized, having already noted that, as a phenomenon it was 
easier to describe than to give an adequate juridical name.  He debated the 
terms, “exchange,” “borrowing,” and “imitation,” or whether, as noted 
above, one should borrow “the language of advanced surgery” and talk of 
“transplantation of organs,” though the donor kept the organ and it was a 
facsimile that was attempted to be integrated into a new milieu.  But the 
problem would be to know if the organ was accepted into the body or was 
rejected.  Rivero decided that the terminology was not important, but 
description of the phenomenon was.196  But his flirting with the terminology 
of legal transplant is significant in indicating the type of phenomenon of 
which he was thinking, as he put it: 
The entire history of constitutions, except for a few rare 
original prototypes, was made up of imitations, adaptations and 
rejections.  The history of civil law itself offers classic 
examples, whether it be Ataturk’s Turkey importing the Swiss 
Civil Code, or the diffusion of the Code Napoléon.197 
His whole paper is full of the language of borrowing (emprunte), 
transplanting (greffe), and rejection.  He mentioned the “fundamental 
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problem posed by all transplants: the success or failure of the operation.”198  
He explored the contexts of transplants that were successful and those that 
were rejected. Seemingly unaware of Rivero’s paper, in 1976, Jean 
Gaudemet, a noted French historian of medieval civil and canon law, 
published an article entitled “Les transferts de droit.”199  In it he pointed out 
that lawyers, sociologists and historians all viewed law differently.  He 
thought it possible nonetheless to draw on these different approaches to 
explain the juridical experience of which history furnished many examples 
that had very varied origins and causes, namely: “the introduction into a 
society of law or specific legal rules that had been developed in a different 
social situation and sometimes in an already distant era.”200  Gaudemet noted 
that one could discuss the effects of European colonization and influence in 
the Americas, Africa and Asia; but he limited his discussion to ancient 
Rome, medieval and modern Europe, and the spread of the Code Napoléon 
in the nineteenth century.201  He explained successful “receptions” as due to 
the technical qualities of the borrowed law, especially if local customs were 
undeveloped, particularly in face of a transforming society.  He also noted 
the significance of the prestige of a culture, the technical qualities of a code, 
and its style as factors.  He also isolated problems in reception.  But he 
focused on the significance of practitioners and legislators in a successful 
reception.  His factors and mechanisms were in many ways comparable with 
those isolated by Alan.202  Other French scholars, drawing on similar ideas, 
developed the concept of “migration of legal systems.”203  Thus, in French, 
the terminology of “transfert,” “migration,” “greffe,” “imitation,” 
“importation,” and “circulation” became used to deal with the type of 
phenomena already discussed by Alan.204 
In 1974, Rodolfo Sacco, an Italian comparativist, had linked the type of 
phenomena Alan labelled transplants with methodological issues of 
comparative law.205  Sacco continued to develop these ideas through the 
                                                                                                                   
 198 Id. at 468 (“[Le] problème essentiel posé par toute greffe: la réussite ou l’échec de 
l’opération.”). 
 199 Jean Gaudemet, Les transferts de droit, 27 L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE 29 (1976). 
 200 Id. (“[L]’entrée dans une société d’un droit ou de certaines règles juridiques qui ont été 
élaborées dans un milieu social different et parfois à une époque déjà lointaine.”). 
 201 Id. at 31. 
 202 Cf. Two-Tier Law, supra note 116. 
 203 René Rodière, Approche d’un phenomenon: les migrations des sistèmes juridiques, in 
MÉLANGES DÉDIÉES À GABRIEL MARTY 947 (1978). 
 204 For the last two, see Éric Agostini, La circulation des modèles juridiques, 42 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 461 (1990). 
 205 Rodolfo Sacco, Les buts et les méthodes de la comparaison du droit, in RAPPORTS 
NATIONAUX ITALIENS AU IX CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ 113, 127–31 (1974) 
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1970s.  In 1977, he contributed to the colloquium at Badia Fiesolana on a 
“Common Law of Europe.”  His title was “Droit commun de l’Europe, et 
composantes du droit.”206  In it he discussed the “circulation des modèles 
jurisprudentiels” as a factor in unifying law.207  “Composantes du droit” 
seems to be a French rendering of his now well-known idea of “formanti” or 
“legal formants.”208  The theory of “legal formants” is that the “legal 
landscape consists of components not necessarily coherent with each other,” 
rather than of a hierarchical set of norms, in style a pyramid, deriving from a 
“sovereign at the top directed to the subject at the bottom.”  It has recently 
been described as “probably the most important and lasting contribution of 
Italian scholarship to the discipline of comparative law.”209  Sacco accepted 
the idea of transplants or (in French) “circulation.”210  In 1980, he published 
a very influential textbook on comparative law,211 in which, by the fifth 
edition, he had an extensive discussion of Alan’s work in his development of 
his ideas of transplants in line with his theory of legal formants.212  The 
influence of Sacco in Italy and France helped further popularize Alan’s work 
on transplants in these two countries and make it familiar to continental 
Europeans.  As a result, in 1984, Legal Transplants was published in an 
Italian edition.213  
By 1985 Legal Transplants was becoming routinely cited on topics such 
the borrowing of an exclusionary rule in criminal evidence, or legal thought 
in Upper Canada.214  It may be pointed out that Whelan, who in 1982 had 
been strongly influenced by Kahn-Freund, now cited Legal Transplants in 
1985 in a string of citations to support the proposition that there “has been 
for some time a substantial but largely theoretical body of literature 
                                                                                                                   
(found cited in Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and 
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 41, at 441, 442). 
 206 Rodolfo Sacco, Droit commn de l’Europe, et composantes de droit, in NEW 
PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 95 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978). 
 207 Id. at 97–107. 
 208 See Pierre Legrand, Questions à Rodolfo Sacco, 47 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARÉ 943, 965–67 (1995).  In French, the term “formants” later became standard. 
 209 Elisabetta Grandi, Development of Comparative Law in Italy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 41, at 107, 115. 
 210 Legrand, supra note 208, at 970. 
 211 RUDOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO: SOMMARIO DELLE LEZIONI DI 
DIRITTO PRIVATO COMPARATO TENUTE NELL’UNIVERSITÀ DI TORINO NELL’ANNO ACCADEMICO 
1979–80 (2d ed. 1980). 
 212 RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 132–54 (5th ed. 1992). 
 213 ALAN WATSON, IL TRAPIANTO DI NORME GIURIDICHE: UN “APPROCCIO” AL DIRITTO 
COMPARATO (1984). 
 214 Walter Pakter, Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany, and Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 34 (1985); G. Blaine Baker, The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal 
Thought in the Late-Victorian Empire, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 219, 247, 260, 284 (1985). 
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proposing ground rules for proper application of the comparative method.”215  
In the same year, in a bibliographical survey of comparative law, Kurt 
Schwerin could write: 
Much of Watson’s thesis as to the impact of Roman Law on the 
civil law systems and its transplantability is well-known and 
undisputed by every comparatist.  What is disputable is the 
emphasis on pure legal history as against social, economic, 
philosophical, and political influences.  Watson’s approach is 
noteworthy.216 
He was commenting on Alan’s later book, The Making of the Civil Law, 
which explains the focus of the quotation, though he did acknowledge the 
relationship to Legal Transplants.217  But it should be noted, this was no 
longer a blunt rejection of Alan’s views; but rather it was a claim that Alan’s 
emphasis on the forces behind legal change is wrong—the basic thesis of 
Legal Transplants was now claimed as accepted by all comparative lawyers.  
As a scholar working on public law contemporaneously put it: “There is now 
a substantial literature concerned with the problems of seeking to transfer or 
‘transplant’ a rule or technique developed in one culture to another.”218  
V.  THE TRIUMPH OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, 1986–2013 
It is not possible to treat this period with the same level of detail.  This is 
because use of the term “legal transplant” has become so universal in the last 
quarter-century that it is simply not feasible to discuss the literature other 
than in a highly selective fashion.  And the volume of discussion generated 
has indeed been enormous, as a general acceptance of Alan’s approach, at 
least in part, as having value and utility has developed (although some 
scholars have remained hostile).  As a quick demonstration, one can point to 
the recent Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law as having devoted a 
chapter to transplants in considering, “Approaches to Comparative Law.”219 
The extent to which Alan’s arguments have provided a standard means of 
analysis in comparative law is underscored by the remark on the opening 
                                                                                                                   
 215 Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1426 
(1985). 
 216 Kurt Schwerin, Comparative Law Reflections: A Bibliographical Survey, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1315, 1329 (1985).  
 217 Id. at 1328. 
 218 John Goldring, Public Law and Accountability of Government, 15 FED. L. REV. 1, 16 
(1985). 
 219 Graziadei, supra note 205, at 441. 
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page of the even more recent Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law 
that one way of understanding comparative law is “as the study of legal 
transplants — that is, of the borrowing of ideas between legal cultures and/or 
systems. . . .”220  To demonstrate the triumph of legal transplants, we may 
first consider some very recent articles, from differing areas of the law, 
which draw in some way on Alan’s theories, and show how varied the use of 
Alan’s theorizing has become, before considering the developments in this 
period. 
The distinguished company lawyer John H. Farrar published an article in 
2011 on the liability of company directors, arguing that a transplant within 
the Anglo-American company law world had caused problems.  He 
suggested that had more attention been paid to the operation of a rule in the 
United States, it might not have been transplanted to Malaysia and Australia.  
It did not fit well with Australian practice.221  Even though his point might 
arguably be seen as supporting Kahn-Freund’s approach, it was Alan’s work 
that was cited.222  In the same year Meryll Dean argued that her study of jury 
trial in Japan showed the basic accuracy of Alan’s theory of transplants.223  
In 2010, the distinguished French legal historian, Jean-Louis Halpérin, 
applied the ideas of transplants to colonial India.224  The year before, Eric 
Gillman had published a paper on the transplanting of trade and investment 
law from the United States to Latin America.225  Legal Transplants has also 
been seen as providing a means to analyze U.S. trust law in China.226  
Scholars have also looked at transplantation of legal ideas through private 
contracting, as distinct from through the activities of the state.227  These 
topics are far from Alan’s own particular interests, again demonstrating the 
success of Legal Transplants. 
By 1985 the tide had very definitely started to turn in favor of Legal 
Transplants; to trace its subsequent rise to being a dominant idea in 
comparative law, it is worth starting with a review in 1987 of The Evolution 
                                                                                                                   
 220 Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Diapositives versus Movies — The Inner Dynamics of the 
Law and its Comparative Account, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 
3 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
 221 John H. Farrar, Directors’ Duties of Care: Issues of Classification, Solvency, and 
Business Judgment and the Dangers of Transplants, 23 SING. ACAD. L.J. 745, 761 (2011). 
 222 Id. at 761 n.52. 
 223 Dean, supra note 13. 
 224 Jean-Louis Halpérin, Western Legal Transplants and India, 2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 12 
(2010).  I am grateful to Professor Halpérin for supplying me with a copy of his article. 
 225 Eric Gillman, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment Agreements: Understanding 
the Exportation of U.S. Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 282–300 (2009). 
 226 Foster, supra note 10, at 621–37. 
 227 Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct 
in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (2009). 
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of Law (1985) found in the influential “Survey of Books Relating to the 
Law” that the Michigan Law Review publishes each year—the same annual 
survey in which Abel’s “trashing” review of Society and Legal Change had 
appeared a few years earlier.  The reviewer was Michael Hoeflich, a leading 
U.S. legal historian, then of the University of Illinois College of Law.228  
Hoeflich’s careful and scholarly review is important as perhaps the best in 
explaining Alan’s thinking.  Hoeflich described the book thus: 
It is a brief but brilliant exposition of two basic questions.  
First, to what extent is the development of law autonomous and 
independent of societal needs and demands?  Second, how can 
one explain, within the context of this relationship between law 
and society, why so many legal systems borrow extensively, in 
the matter of specific substantive rules as well as broad 
jurisprudential categories, from other alien legal systems? 
 
It is clear that Professor Watson’s concerns stem, to a large 
extent from a question that has troubled legal historians and 
legal philosophers for centuries.  That is: how does one explain 
the puzzling phenomenon of legal reception?229 
Hoeflich’s perceptive analysis went to the core of Alan’s thinking: 
Central to Professor Watson’s theory is the notion that where a 
professional class develops (and he — like I — would argue 
that such a class develops early in Western Europe) it is this 
group’s professional traditions and professional concerns 
which shape the law — especially private law — far more than 
any social input.230 
Hoeflich analyzed Alan’s account of the reception of Roman law in western 
Europe in the early middle ages.  He pointed out that, to a point, most 
scholars would have agreed with much of Alan’s analysis.231  He added, 
however, that: 
                                                                                                                   
 228 Michael H. Hoeflich, Law, Society and Reception: The Vision of Alan Watson, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1083 (1987) (reviewing THE EVOLUTION OF LAW, supra note 186).  As noted above, 
the book developed Alan’s earlier arguments. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 1085. 
 231 Id. at 1085–88. 
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What is crucial to Professor Watson’s view of law . . . comes 
after this initial reception.  These Roman rules, once adopted, 
continued to be included in Germanic legal compilations, and 
these compilations themselves tended to be adopted and 
adapted cross-nationally for centuries throughout Western 
Europe.  Were they at all times fulfilling a perceived and 
current societal need?  Professor Watson would argue that they 
were not.  Rather, by virtue of having become established legal 
rules, they became the property of legists and as such came to 
have a life independent of immediate social demands.  Indeed, 
this would seem to have been the case.  They continued to be 
compiled and adopted because they had become part of a legal 
canon accepted by legal professionals.  The legal history of 
early medieval Europe in this regard tends to bear out Professor 
Watson’s theories.232 
He explained that what this means is that “the interconnection between law 
and society is not so close as to preclude borrowing from alien systems.  
Reception is both possible and explicable so long as one recognizes that the 
most important group for reception of legal rules is the legal elite.”233  In 
sum, what matters most is the attitude of the lawyers and the law-making 
elite, who may “act as a filter of social demands;” indeed they may, for 
reasons of their own deliberately ignore them.234 
Other than one or two of the reviews of The Making of the Civil Law, this 
was the first really sympathetic and sensitive review of Alan’s work on 
comparative law to appear in the United States since Maechling’s original 
assessment of Legal Transplants twelve years earlier.235  But there are many 
other indicators of a general change of attitude Alan’s work on transplants.  
Thus, he was now cited approvingly even in Kahn-Freund’s field of labor 
law.  In the introduction to The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945, Bob (now Sir Bob) 
Hepple, one of Britain’s most distinguished labor lawyers, wrote in 1986: 
“The generalization that ‘borrowing (with adaptation) has been the usual way 
of legal development’ is at least as true for labour law as it is for other 
branches of law.”236  The quotation was from Legal Transplants, which he 
                                                                                                                   
 232 Id. at 1088–89. 
 233 Id. at 1089. 
 234 Id. at 1093. 
 235 See, e.g., Herman, Book Review, supra note 182. 
 236 Bob Hepple, Introduction, in THE MAKING OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE 
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cited.237  Indeed, authors developed hypotheses from Legal Transplants and 
drew on its thinking in fields as diverse as feminism and pornography238 and 
the possibility of reforming American criminal justice with selective 
borrowing from French law.239  Curiously enough, it could still sometimes be 
cited simply for some information it contained, such as the development of 
the law on legitimation by subsequent marriage in New Zealand and 
England.240  Given how many other sources there must have been for this 
information, the citation is testimony to the success of the book as a standard 
work, being treated now almost as one of reference rather than of opinion.  
Of course, detractors remained;241 but they were fewer. 
If by the later 1980s Alan’s idea of legal transplants was becoming very 
well-known, two events made his work resonate even more for 
contemporaries through the 1990s.  The first was the destruction of the 
Berlin wall and the consequent astonishingly rapid collapse of the Soviet 
Empire.  A whole series of new states emerged or old states re-emerged in 
central and Eastern Europe, seeking modern legal systems and laws.242  The 
second was the intensification of the debate over harmonization or 
unification of private law in Europe, a debate made more urgent by the 
European Parliament’s quite extraordinary issue of resolutions calling for a 
code of European Law.243  
In 1990, given how current the issue was becoming, it is no surprise that 
the XIIIth Congress of Comparative Law, held in Montreal in 1990, devoted 
                                                                                                                   
McDonough, Transferability of Labor Law: Can an American Transplant Take Root in British 
Soil?, COMP. LAB. L.J. 504 (1992) (returning to the debate with Kahn-Freund). 
 237 LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 7. 
 238 See Charlotte L. Bynum, Feminism and Pornography: A New Zealand Perspective, 65 
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 239 See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
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Russian Federation, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (1996) (detailing how post-
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and the Codification of “Private Law,” 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 321 (2000) (examining the 
problems with and prospects for the development of a European private law). 
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a section to “Circulation des modèles juridiques,” in other words, to legal 
transplants.  The American scholar Edward Wise provided an important 
discussion, published in the supplement to the American Journal of 
Comparative Law, that started with a full and very detailed analysis of 
Alan’s work on transplants.  Drawing a contrast with Montesquieu and 
Friedman, Wise stressed Alan’s arguments in favor of the relative autonomy 
of law, largely due to the significance of the legal profession in developing 
the law, and the importance of borrowing in this development.244  A 
discussion of the historiography of U.S. legal history followed.245  Wise then 
noted that borrowing was a common cultural experience: it was not restricted 
to law, developing a critique of Alan’s views that accepted much of what he 
said, but arguing that influences on borrowing were wider than Alan 
suggested.246  
The next year, Sacco’s Italian textbook was published in French.247  
Though never published in an English translation as a book, much of its 
substance appeared in the same year in two lengthy articles translated from 
the Italian.  These were edited by the legal historian and comparative lawyer 
Jim Gordley and printed in the American Journal of Comparative Law.248  
This version rather underplays the very extensive attention given to Alan’s 
work on transplants found in the fourth edition of Sacco’s textbook; 
nonetheless this prominent and much cited publication inevitably engendered 
further consideration of Alan’s work, both in Europe and North America.  
An overt consideration of the correspondence between their ideas appeared a 
couple of years later.249  In 1994, Alan participated in the ceremony in the 
University of Turin when Sacco was presented with his Festschrift, 
delivering a paper entitled “From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants.”250  
The popularity of Sacco’s work both at home and elsewhere, combined with 
his and his pupils’ dominant position in comparative law in Italy, inevitably 
                                                                                                                   
 244 Edward Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 1, 1–7 (1990). 
 245 Id. at 7–15. 
 246 Id. at 16–22.  For the French report, see Agostini, supra note 204. 
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promoted further reflection on Alan’s scholarship on Legal Transplants.251  
The work of Michele Graziadei has proved particularly insightful and 
important in developing our understanding of legal transplants.252 
Interest in Alan’s work was now such that a second edition of Legal 
Transplants was published by the University of Georgia Press in 1993.  It 
consisted of a reproduction of the first edition with an “Afterword.”253  
Perhaps it was this publication with the continuing debate that stimulated 
William Ewald in 1995 to publish a fundamentally sympathetic evaluation 
and interpretation of Alan’s work (which does not mean Alan should be 
taken as accepting all of Ewald’s analysis).254  This was part of Ewald’s 
general project on comparative law.255  Ewald did not reflect, for example, on 
the relationship between the theorizing of Alan and Sacco, but instead 
investigated Alan’s corpus of writings.  His aim was to synthesize Alan’s 
views on comparative law and set them out in a logical and much more 
abstract form, divorced from the detailed historical discussions in which 
Alan had developed them.256  Ewald argued that there was “Weak Watson” 
and “Strong Watson.”257  Alan would dispute this.258  But Ewald’s analysis 
has exerted considerable influence on further discussion of the possibilities 
of transplants.259  In particular his description of approaches such as that of 
Friedman as “mirror theories” has resonated.260  He also convincingly 
                                                                                                                   
 251 For some interesting reflections on Sacco’s influence, see BASIL MARKESINIS, 
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demonstrated the mistaken nature and weakness of aspects of Abel’s 
critique.261  Some scholars, however, have rejected Ewald’s privileging of an 
essentially philosophical approach to comparative law, and have found more 
merit in Alan’s arguments themselves.262  Indeed others have attempted to 
develop the idea in quite different and also interesting ways.263  
But a renewed line of debate over Alan’s theory of legal transplants has 
developed, linked to some extent to Ewald’s discussion.  Partly similar to the 
views early expressed by Kahn-Freund, this might loosely be described as 
focused on the concept of “legal culture,” and it has become a fairly 
dominant mode of criticism.  The fundamental idea is the obvious one that 
focusing on the rules of positive law misses much that is important about any 
legal system.  The deployment of legal culture as an analytical category in 
sociological approaches to law has been strongly associated since 1969 with 
the work of Lawrence Friedman.264  In that year he commented: “Much of 
the working law of a mature, industrial society is comparatively specific to 
its country.”265  He also commented that “only recently have societies 
borrowed codes, legal systems, and whole bodies of law.”266  In a paper from 
1985, but published in English in 1990, the German legal historian, Franz 
Wieacker, drawing on historical evidence, argued that there was a European 
legal culture, and attempted to identify its features.267  Some have found 
Friedman’s concept of legal culture fragmented and vague;268 Wieacker’s 
account was so abstract that it is difficult to assess the significance of his 
claims.  Despite this, however, a relatively early deployment of this approach 
in comparative law is found in Bernhard Grossfeld’s study, published in 
English in 1990, where the author argued that legal systems were very 
closely linked to culture generally, including religion, language, and 
geography.269  Grossfeld accepted some of what Alan argued;270  but 
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disagreed with what he considered as Alan’s optimism “about the possibility 
of transplanting legal institutions.”271  The nature of law as a cultural 
phenomenon created such constraints and linked it so closely to the culture 
within which it developed that transfer of laws from one culture to another 
was unlikely and very difficult.  This is not the place to rehearse a critique of 
the details of Grossfeld’s argument;272 but others developed it to encompass 
criticism of Ewald’s attempt to reformulate Alan’s views of transplants in a 
more abstract fashion.273  It is important to point out, however, that Alan 
himself draws on ideas of culture, but ones significantly less broad than those 
of Grossfeld, instead concentrating on the significance of the legal culture of 
the lawyers;274 but the early association of “legal culture” with the work of 
Friedman, understanding the concept as being about a “totality” of culture, 
has tended to lead more theoretically-focused scholars to embed in the 
concept his assumptions about law and society, particularly given the 
potential vagueness and flexibility of the idea.275 
What Grossfeld argued has been developed in its extreme form by Pierre 
Legrand in a number of papers from the mid-1990s onwards, the most 
important of which claimed that legal transplants were impossible.276  
Legrand’s argument was elaborated from what were essentially 
epistemological premises and anthropological theory.  He argued that law 
simply could not be separated from its context.  Indeed the law only existed 
as interpreted and applied “within an interpretative community.”277  Law was 
“a matter of myth and narrative,” which, if belonging to another culture, we 
could only grasp “imperfectly through translation rather than expect to find a 
method of reproducing its ‘effects.’ ”278  To put it crudely, in other words, 
law only has a meaning in context; change the context and the law changes.  
It is, of course, far from a foolish argument; but one astute, although not 
unsympathetic, critic of Legrand states: 
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A number of points could be made in reply to Legrand’s 
objections to legal transplants.  Much depends on the meaning 
given to this term.  Alan Watson for example uses his data 
about transplants to refute Legrand’s claims about the 
relationship between law and its context but is willing to 
concede that a legal transplant cannot be expected to engineer a 
determined solution but will take on a life of its own in its new 
host.  Legrand may be battling with his own chosen 
interpretation of the transplant metaphor.  He also appears at 
times to treat empirical claims as if they were logical ones—
and risks the contradictions of cultural relativism.279 
Alan’s own response to Legrand is similar, and grounded in the documented 
empirical claim “that massive successful borrowing is commonplace in law.”  
In the face of Legrand’s arguments, he has reasserted that “borrowing is 
usually the major factor in legal change,” and that legal borrowing is to be 
equated with “legal transplants.”280  
Much of Legrand’s argument against transplants arises from his 
opposition to the calls for a European Civil Code.281  In the very different 
context of the early 1970s, Alan had argued that the fact of transplants meant 
that it should be possible “to frame a single basic code of private law to 
operate throughout [the whole of the Western world].”282  When read in 
1974, this will have seemed an interesting observation about an unlikely 
eventuality; when a new edition appeared twenty years later, however, after 
the call for codification of a European private law, it took on a different 
appearance.283  Much effort has now been devoted to various projects of 
harmonization or even unification of law in Europe.284  Hence Legrand’s 
opposition to Alan’s idea of legal transplants: if transplants were easy, then it 
would be easy to create and enforce a new European code of private law.  Of 
course, Alan would acknowledge the potential problems, but he would argue 
that there are simply no technical problems in doing this, provided that there 
was “a uniform system of adjudicating differences within a standard 
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framework of the necessary sources of law.”285  He would add: “Authority is 
paramount, because it alone can constitute the common element.”286 
Gunther Teubner, best known as a system-theorist, intervened in this 
debate in a much-cited and powerful article, focusing on attempts to unify 
law within the European Union.  He saw Legrand as offering a 
“contemporary reformulation of Montesquieu’s culturalist scepticism. . . .”287  
He raised a number of theoretical difficulties and empirical observations 
against Legrand’s work, also commenting (in 1998) that “Legrand’s still 
rather modest efforts stand in somewhat strange contrast to the sweeping 
claims of his general programme.”288  Teubner noted that Alan’s arguments 
on transplants had foundations in rich and detailed historical evidence 
showing that “transferring legal institutions between societies has been an 
enormous historical success,” despite a “bewildering diversity of socio-
economic structures.”289  He summed up Alan’s claims thus: 
He explains the success of legal transplants by a highly 
developed autonomy of the modern legal profession.  He 
confronts functionalist comparativists with the theoretical 
argument that convergence of socio-economic structures as 
well as functional equivalence of legal institutions in fact do 
not matter at all.  Neither does — and this is his message to the 
culturalists—the totality of a society’s culture.290 
Teubner saw these claims as based on three arguments that he set out with a 
careful evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses: “[C]omparative law 
should no longer simply study foreign laws but study the interrelations 
between different legal systems”;291 “[T]ransplants [are] the main source of 
legal change”;292 and “[L]egal evolution takes place rather insulated from 
social changes, that it tends to use the technique of ‘legal borrowing’ and can 
be explained without reference to social, political, or economic factors.”293  
Teubner was sympathetic to much that Alan had written, but saw Alan’s 
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theorization as limited and in need of development.  He argued that Alan 
“seems to be obsessed with the somewhat sterile alternative of cultural 
dependency versus legal insulation, of social context versus legal autonomy, 
an obsession which he shares, of course, with his opponents.”294  Teubner 
suggested that “legal transplant” was a misleading metaphor, and argued 
engagingly for his own idea of “legal irritant.”295 
In the context of the debates over law in Europe, there can be no doubt 
but that Legrand’s very strongly phrased “culturalist” critique of Alan’s 
theory helped considerably to spread and indeed to renew interest in legal 
transplants; Teubner’s important contribution also stimulated reflection on 
Alan’s work, and was reprinted in a leading collection on the legal effects of 
European integration.296  Likewise, the developing debate over legal culture 
in the 1990s also raised important questions about transplants; it also had to 
take into account Alan’s own view of what legal culture was and how it had 
a determining effect on legal change.297  Friedman has remained very 
dismissive of Alan’s work on transplants; other scholars examining the 
concept legal culture have not been so dismissive, and have continued to find 
it necessary to address the theory of legal transplants.298  Alan’s narrower 
focus on lawyers and legal elites generally has been viewed as highly 
plausible, though inchoate as lacking detailed empirical historical study.299  
One of the most significant scholars in promoting studies of legal culture 
and comparative law since the mid-1990s is David Nelken, a sociologist of 
law.  In 1995, he organized a conference devoted to legal cultures at the 
University of Macerata.300  Helping further spread interest was a series of 
workshops held in the later 1990s at the International Institute for the 
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Sociology of Law in Oñati.  These generated a number of publications.301  
One of the main organizers of these was Johannes Feest.302  From our point 
of view most significant was the workshop “on piecemeal adaptation of legal 
cultures,” organized at Oñati by Nelken and Feest.303  A central issue of the 
workshop was legal transplants, and after some more theoretical discussions 
of it, a number of papers were devoted to specific studies of legal borrowing 
and adaptation.304  In the resulting book, Nelken summed up the discussion 
of Watson’s and Ewald’s work, reflecting on transplants from the 
perspectives provided by sociology.305  Chapters by Legrand, Cotterrell, and 
Friedman have already been noticed here: the first presenting his usual 
argument on the impossibility of transplants, the second assessing transplants 
in the light of his ideas of community, and the third basically dismissing the 
idea.306  Andrew Harding, however, in one of the empirical studies in the 
volume, commented that “it seems as if Watson’s theory of legal 
transplantation, according to South East Asian experience, is made out to a 
remarkable extent . . . . [L]aw in South East Asia has evolved out of legal 
transplantation, which has on the whole been successful.”307  While he 
thought there might be particular local factors at play, he concluded: 
[I]n broad terms the Watsonian thesis that the idea of a law can 
be readily transplanted is, in relation to South East Asia, clearly 
made out.  The strictures of Montesquieu and Kahn-Freund do 
not in general apply in South East Asia, and in fact their 
theories are disproved by the South East Asian experience.  
This is not the same as saying that all “repotting” of legal ideas 
will result in instant blooms.  South East Asia shows that, 
under conditions of legal pluralism, absorption of legal ideas, 
even imposed ones, takes place over time, slowly and even 
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painfully.  The evidence of successful legal transplants of 
almost every conceivable kind is powerful.308 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth concluded their study of transplants, focusing 
on developments in Central and South America by acknowledging that “[t]he 
idea that legal transplants came from an autonomous group of elite lawyers, as 
suggested by Alan Watson, is not implausible for this kind of process.”309  In a 
study of debt, John Flood concluded that “[i]insolvency does, however, 
demonstrate Watson’s thesis that comparative lawyers should study the 
interrelations of legal systems rather than the operation of foreign laws.”310 
By the end of the 1990s, the idea of legal culture was becoming a 
commonly used analytical category in comparative law, along with notions 
such as legal tradition, as scholars tried to get beyond simple positivism, 
functionalism and concepts such as that of “legal family.”311  The debates 
that had already developed thus meant that when a sociologist of law, such as 
Roger Cotterrell, in reflecting on social theory and culture, turned to consider 
comparative law, he inevitably discussed legal transplants.312  But the 
concept of legal culture continued to be relied on and developed by 
comparative lawyers in the new century.313  That there was sometimes seen 
to be an incompatibility between culture and transplant must have made the 
topic all the more compelling, raising potentially interesting theoretical 
issues.  Perhaps this led to the session on “Legal Culture and Legal 
Transplants” (“La culture juridique et l’acculturation du droit”) at the 
XVIIIth Congress of Comparative Law in 2010, held in Washington, D.C.  It 
is interesting to note, however, that the National Reports tended to assume 
that the concept of legal culture was quite obvious and unproblematic, and 
did not consider there to be any problems of the type identified by Grossfeld, 
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Legrand, Nelken, or Friedman in relating it to legal transplants.  This, of 
course, may be the result of the questions put to the delegates; but no 
difficulties were reported, and the concept of legal transplant drawn on by 
the delegates was largely understood as that developed by Alan, used without 
any questioning or indication that it might be debatable.314 
Thus, though critics remain, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-
first century, the concept of legal transplant as developed and utilized by 
Alan has become a standard way to approach comparative law.  The 
pressures of globalization and, within Europe, harmonization, have continued 
to ensure its continuing relevance to debates on law.315  During the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, a discussion in German added to the 
already extensive discussions of transplants in other languages.316  In 2008, a 
research group on “Histories of Common Law Legal Transplants” met in the 
Institute for Advanced Studies in Jerusalem and a joint conference on the 
theme was held at the Faculty of Law in Tel Aviv in June of that year.317  
The papers were published in a special issue of a journal.  Only one essay 
was devoted to theoretical issues, and, in a sophisticated discussion, it 
accepted the utility of the concept as offering a dynamic approach to 
comparative law;318 but the other essays accepted legal transplants largely as 
a simple given.  The ultimate success of legal transplants as an approach to 
comparative law is clear.  
VI.  CONCLUSION: THE PREHISTORY OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 
Mark Freedland, in his sensitive and touching evocation of the character 
and scholarship of his Doktorvater, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, writes that his 
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mentor’s “most significant contribution to the general theory of comparative 
law” was made in his Chorley Lecture of 1973: 
It is here that he evokes and analyses “the problem of 
transplantation.”  The notion of “legal transplant” has become 
so firmly part of the vocabulary of comparative legal studies 
that it is now profoundly exciting to be reminded of its origin 
in this lecture.  For Kahn-Freund, the “problem of 
transplantation” was the inappropriateness of assuming that a 
legal norm or structure which had been seen to work well in 
one jurisdiction could be successfully introduced into another.  
This he saw as the heeding and re-stating in a modern idiom of 
Montesquieu’s warning that: Les lois politiques et civiles de 
chaque nation . . . doivent être tellement propres au people pour 
lequel elles sont faites, que c’est un grand hazard si celles 
d’une nation peuvent convenir à un autre.”319 
Of course, Kahn-Freund’s notion of “legal transplant” was indeed born in 
that lecture on June 26, 1973; but as we have already seen the term or idea 
was used almost contemporaneously—if not earlier—by Alan,320 by 
Beckstrom,321 and by Rivero.322  As argued, the term was ripe for such 
metaphoric usage in this period; there can be no surprise that these four 
scholars adopted it at much the same time. 
Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the term had been used earlier by 
a number of British scholars.323  Thus in 1950, B.A. Wortley had reported 
that the UNIDROIT conference in Rome had concluded that “the time was 
[not] ripe for the transplanting of the Trust into other countries.”324  In 1955, 
C.J. Hamson had noted that the Istanbul conference of the International 
Committee of Comparative Law in 1955 had considered “the conditions and 
circumstances under which a foreign system of law has in modern times been 
received in a country having a cultural background and tradition different 
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from that of the country in which the system originally developed.”325  He 
noted that the Istanbul Conference was interested not so much in receptions 
within Europe, but in those instances of reception where it was possible to 
examine “the possibility and the effect of the transplantation of a system of 
law into a significantly different culture.”326  Prominent examples of such 
“transplantation” were “in those European colonies where the indigenous 
populations remain the predominant cultural element.”327  The future of these 
colonies “was likely to be of capital significance to our own civilization and 
in that course the success or failure of the transplantation of a European 
system of law will be a critical factor.”328 
The modern scholar329 who first (as far as I have been able to trace) seems 
to have used the metaphor of “transplant” or “transplantation” to explain 
legal development was, however, the Scots advocate, Frederick P. Walton, in 
1927.  Born in England, Walton had studied classics at Oxford and law at 
Edinburgh and Marburg, before being admitted as an advocate of the Scots 
bar in 1886.  In 1894, he was appointed Lecturer in Civil (i.e., Roman) Law 
in the University of Glasgow and became Secretary to the Lord Advocate, 
J.B. Balfour, the appointment ending in June 1895 when Balfour lost office 
with the defeat of the Rosebery Government.  He was next appointed 
Professor of Roman Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the McGill 
University in Montreal in 1897.  He moved to Egypt in 1915 to become 
Director of the Khedivial School of Law in Cairo in succession to Maurice 
Sheldon Amos.  He returned to Britain and settled in Oxford in the mid-
1920s.  Sociable and hospitable, Walton was Secretary to the Law Club, a 
dining club of academic lawyers in Oxford.  Following the death of his wife 
in 1932, he retired to Edinburgh, where he lived in Great King Street until 
his own death.330 Walton’s grasp of the idea of legal transplantation 
developed out of the experiences of his imperial academic career combined 
with his training in Scots law and Roman law.  In the later nineteenth 
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century, Scots lawyers were coming to see their legal system as having a 
“mixed and varied character.”331  This was because of its “large debt to the 
jurisprudence of other countries, especially to the Roman and English 
law.”332  In other words, Walton’s training as a Scots lawyer will have led 
him to realize that law could be successfully imported and need not be 
“indigenous.”  His experiences of Quebec and Egypt will have reinforced 
this view.  In the former, he found another jurisdiction in which “the law 
occupies a position midway between the Common law and the Civil law.”333  
In 1913, he wrote that “the two countries whose legal systems present the 
closest analogy to that of Quebec are Louisiana and Egypt.”334  This was 
because of the shared background in French law and the influence in all three 
of the French code.  But he also recognized a similarity to Scotland.335 
Walton was also alive to the significance of the historical relationships 
between legal systems.  While at McGill, he published for the law students 
Historical Introduction to Roman Law, because, in “a country of the Civil 
Law, like the Province of Quebec,” it was important “to show the way in 
which the Roman Law has grown into the modern Civil Law.”336  He was 
likewise alive to the relationship between the law of France and that of 
Scotland, because they were “to a great extent derived from the same 
sources,” though there was “little evidence” of “direct borrowing.”337  He 
noted that Scotland had “long ceased to be a system of civil law in the same 
sense as the  law of France, Germany, or Italy,” since, “[l]ike the laws of 
Lower Canada and of Louisiana, the Scots law has been profoundly modified 
by contact with the English common law.”338  He nonetheless surveyed the 
historical resemblances and differences explaining how they had come about.  
In another study he had noted that: 
[A] great part of the Common law of Scotland is still Roman 
law, not more modified than the Heutiges Römisches Recht of 
Germany or the Droit Civil of France.  The law of obligations, 
except where changed by legislation, or the law of servitudes, 
is very much the same in Scotland as in France.  Moreover 
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Scotland has preserved the same technical phraseology.  A 
French lawyer, turning over a Scots law book, would be 
astonished to meet at every turn terms with which he was 
familiar.  When the Civil Code of Lower Canada was being 
prepared, the commissioners were sometimes hard put to it to 
turn into English some term of the old French law. . . .  By a 
happy thought the commissioners turned to the Scots law and 
found sometimes there the very words they wanted . . . .339 
Walton’s experience of Egypt during the “Veiled Protectorate” would have 
introduced him to a complex and plural system of courts and laws. “Mixed 
Courts” had been introduced to deal with matters involving the substantial 
foreign community; “Native Courts” dealt with matters exclusively involving 
Egyptians.  Mixed Courts had a bench consisting of Egyptian judges and 
jurists from sixteen western countries.  Similar codes, based on those of 
France, but which also gave scope for equitable development, were employed 
in both sets of courts.340  In particular, Walton made a significant study of the 
Egyptian codes, publishing a major, two-volume comparative study of the 
Egyptian law of obligations.341  A second edition appeared in 1923.342  Again, 
he would have increased his knowledge of borrowing of laws. 
Drawing on these experiences, Walton addressed the International 
Academy of Comparative Law on August 1, 1927 on “The Historical School 
of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of Law.”343  The address was 
published as an article the same year, with the first part devoted to a 
reassessment of F.C. von Savigny’s views on law, particularly as expressed 
in his famous pamphlet of 1814, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung 
und Rechtswissenschaft.344  He described Savigny’s view thus: 
Savigny’s theory is that the law of any country grows up 
naturally by customary usage and without legislation.  It is a 
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product of the peculiar genius of a particular people.  It may be 
compared with a language.  The law of a people, like their 
language, has an organic connexion with their peculiar being 
and character.345 
Savigny, according to Walton, saw the ancient customs of a nation as 
“almost part of the blood and bone of a people.”346  He noted, however, that 
“most unfortunately for Savigny’s theory, there was, besides this old 
Gewohnheitsrecht, a great deal of German law which had not grown up in 
this rather mysterious way.”347  As well as “plenty of enacted law . . . there 
was also the great body of law—the so-called modern Roman law, or 
Pandektenlehre—of which certainly it could not be said that it grew out of 
German consciousness or that it reflected their peculiar national mind and 
character.”348  To overcome this problem, Savigny argued that, at a certain 
stage in the history of a nation, “a class of professional jurists arises.”349  
This led to law developing in a different fashion.  In Germany, however, the 
lawyers “went back to Roman law, and devoted all their energies to 
introduce a body of laws which had been evolved in a society profoundly 
different from that of Germany.”350  The “fatal point” was that in Germany 
this law was “of foreign origin.”351 Savigny’s “arguments in favour of 
keeping inviolate laws which are the heritage of the race, and in which the 
national character finds its expression . . . lose much of their force when we 
face the facts.”  Indeed: 
The truth of the matter is that a very large part of the German 
law did not grow out of the consciousness of the German 
people, and does not bear the marks of their national genius, 
but, on the other hand, it grew out of the consciousness of the 
Roman people, and bears the stamp of the Roman mind.352 
This meant that Savigny’s argument against codification in Germany—that 
“it checks the natural and unconscious growth of law”353—is unfounded.  
“Savigny’s famous theory did not square at all well with the facts of German 
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law, and his arguments altogether failed to prevent the making of codes, 
which has gone on merrily since his time.”354  Walton argued, however, that 
Savigny was owed a great debt, as he had shown the importance of the study 
of legal history, which, as a result of his endeavors, had advanced greatly in 
the pasty fifty years in every European country.355 
Walton thought that Savigny would have been “shocked . . . profoundly” 
by some recent events of “an entirely novel character.”356  He thinks it “a 
new phenomenon in the legal world.”357  This was when “a people 
possessing an ancient customary law, which had grown up ages ago out of 
their legal consciousness, has deliberately thrown overboard this heritage of 
the race, and has introduced at one blow a legal system entirely foreign.”358  
He described this as “Transplantation of a Legal System.”359  This was not 
the imposition by a conqueror of his laws on a conquered race, nor was it 
“the case of one country copying a particular rule or a particular piece of 
legislation which has been found to work well in another place,” which “kind 
of legislative borrowing is much commoner than it used to be.”360  Rather, 
the examples he was thinking of were the “transplantations of a legal system, 
or a large part of a legal system, from one country to another.”361  In 
particular he was considering where: 
[W]e see an oriental country with a system of law of great 
antiquity, and, moreover, a system of law which is closely 
bound up with the national religion, casting all, or a great part 
of this old law away, and adopting the law of a western people, 
far removed in race, religion, history and culture.  And yet this 
has happened in our time in Egypt, in Japan and in Turkey.362 
He then discussed briefly these examples of what he had called 
“transplantation.”363  He expressed the view that “the foreign law which has 
been so violently introduced will serve the needs of the people just as well as 
if it had grown out of their own legal consciousness.”364 
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Walton has confined the term “transplantation” to full-scale modern 
transplants; but it is worth noting that he thinks borrowing of rules common, 
perhaps even easy.365  Indeed, how could he think otherwise given his 
experience and his studies of codification?  He had already written in 1916 
that “[c]odifiers are arrant thieves, and every new civil code ought to contain 
some articles which the legislators of other countries will make up their 
minds to steal so soon as a favorable opportunity occurs.”366  In an 
assessment of the law of Czechoslavakia, as represented in a recently 
produced volume, he remarked in 1934, using an interesting horticultural 
metaphor, that it showed  that “new laws, very modern in spirit, have been 
grafted on the old stocks of Austrian law and Hungarian law.”367  In the same 
paper, however, he was fascinated with a volume on Romania, but he 
regretted that the authors had passed “very lightly over what is to a foreign 
student the most interesting question, namely how the French law has 
flourished in Rumania [sic] after it was transplanted there.”368  The adoption 
of French law in Romania started in 1839 with the Code of Commerce; in 
1864, the Civil Code followed.  All of this modernized the law and social 
practices.369  It is clear that he thought this full-scale type of transplantation 
must have been difficult; but his only evidence was a highly romanticized 
remark about the “Rumanian [sic] soul” being absent from the code.370 
With his observations about the frequency of borrowing of legislation and 
his discussions of full-scale transplants, such as those in Romania, Turkey, 
Japan, and Egypt, Walton is approaching Alan’s theory of transplants; but he 
does not quite get there.  He was not willing to put the whole package 
together.  He thought borrowing modern; but this was because he did not 
seem to think of the reception of Roman law as being about borrowing.  He 
saw some types of borrowing as easy; but he assumed that major transplants, 
as in Romania, were not easy.  He did not see the taking of European law to 
the colonies as involving transplantation; only the substitution of one 
sophisticated law system for another was viewed as such.  Perhaps all of this 
was because he focused too much on legislative borrowing.  He did not 
recognize that there must be significant implications for our understanding of 
law and its development.  But the metaphor and the ideas were there.  
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Indeed, the metaphor was then taken up and perhaps extended by other 
comparative lawyers.  In 1930, R.W. Lee, another British comparative lawyer 
with an imperial career, deployed it to take into account European law taken to 
a colony when he talked of Roman-Dutch law as “a body of laws transplanted 
from its native land to distant dependencies overseas.”371 Interestingly enough, 
he drew a comparison with the friend who had gone to the colonies, been lost 
sight of, and returns: much is changed, but some things have remained the 
same.372  But he noted that Roman-Dutch law had “borrowed from [English 
law] much that has helped it to adapt itself to a new age, much too that 
harmonizes imperfectly with what was there before”:373 remarks that 
potentially fit with the ideas of Legal Transplants.  In 1937, Hermann 
Mannheim, a German refugee of Jewish descent, published a study of the use 
of the jury in criminal trials in continental Europe, which he described as a 
“transplantation” from England; he also used the verb “to transplant,” 
discussing a statute.374  Henri Lévy Ullmann, a friend of Walton, referred to his 
usage of transplantation in discussing Turkey in 1939.375  This, of course, leads 
to the use by Wortley and Hamson already noted for the 1950s. 
Given the common usage of the metaphor of “transplant” in many types 
of situation, it would be very odd if there were no other scattered examples 
of the employment of the term in this period to refer to the adoption of rules 
or procedures from another legal system; and it is easy indeed to discover 
these with a simple word-search in a data base.376  But Walton’s discussion 
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of “transplantation” is still unique and important.  He has taken the term as 
providing a metaphor with which we can understand a legal phenomenon, 
and given it significant explanatory power, just in the way Alan was to do in 
the early 1970s for “legal transplants.”  Of course, Walton has not worked 
the idea out so fully as Alan did half a century later; nor would his views and 
Alan’s be at one on all points.  Moreover, Walton’s metaphor was 
presumably horticultural rather than surgical.  But the similarities are still 
striking: borrowing is playing a central part in legal development; the culture 
of lawyers is central to the legal system and the adoption of rules; law is not 
closely linked with society in a necessary fashion (even if Walton’s target 
was Savigny’s idea of law as an expression of the Volksgeist). 
Some classic cases of transplants and receptions, as singled out by 
Michele Graziadei, include: the reception of Roman law; the diffusion of 
some civil codes; diffusion of the common law; and mixed legal systems.377  
Walton, like Watson, was interested in all of these.  Both men also discussed 
to some extent, if in differing ways, the factors Graziadei identifies as 
significant in promoting receptions and transplants.378  Both recognized that 
“transplants can be unsettling to those who believe law must reflect the 
culture and mores of a particular society.”379   
What is interesting is the way Walton’s interests were later echoed by those 
of Alan: Roman law, Scots law, codifications, and mixed legal systems.  This 
suggests that to have been educated in a legal system like Scotland’s that is not 
a dominant one—and which cannot trace or rely on claims (even if pretended) 
of immemorial antiquity—may well help a scholar to develop a predisposition 
to accept the idea of transplants.  Just as the idea of legal transplants obviously 
makes sense as a theory to many Italian and Israeli scholars, so it will resonate 
powerfully for Scots lawyers, such as Alan and Walton, since their legal 
system has quite evidently borrowed much.  Scots lawyers cannot see Scots 
law as an intellectual system closed off from the influence of other laws, and 
whose development can be made subject to a narrow explanation solely in 
terms of Scottish politics, economics and society.  Such a limited set of 
explanations will make no sense. 
By 2013, the forty years of history of legal transplants has led the theory 
from a position of being either largely ignored or rejected to one of being 
generally accepted—often enthusiastically—as a standard approach to 
comparative law—indeed one judged worth developing further.  The same 
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forty years have correspondingly seen Alan’s book, Legal Transplants, turn 
from an often harshly criticized work into a classic of comparative law.  
Frederick Walton is a minor figure, now largely forgotten, except for a few 
scholars of the history of comparative law.  One suspects that, after the 
Second World War, with the end of the British Empire, and the stimulus it 
had very definitely given to the study of comparative law in Great Britain, 
his type of global thinking about law and his type of experience of a wider 
world ended.  By 1970, however, the world was opening again; broader 
perspectives allowed connections that had fallen from sight to be seen once 
more.  A scholar with broadly similar interests to those of Walton, with a 
similarly extensive and detailed knowledge of the legal history of a whole 
variety of societies, could again see that there must be something very 
significant about borrowing, both historical borrowing and borrowing 
between contemporary jurisdictions, and thus about the transplantation of 
laws, whether the transplant was major or small.  The idea of legal 
transplants was at some level the same as the now forgotten usage of fifty 
years earlier.  But scientific developments meant the metaphor took on a new 
coloring and could be extended in different ways, a means was offered to 
explain much through the organization and imagery provided by the 
“transplant” metaphor; and so it was that Legal Transplants: An Approach to 
Comparative Law came to be written. 
 
